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Abstract 
 
The Determinants and Consequences of Big 4 Lobbying Positions on 
Proposed Accounting Standards 
 
Brian Robert Monsen, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisor:  John McInnis 
 
Despite the considerable participation of Big 4 accounting firms in accounting 
standard setting, no studies provide systematic evidence on what factors shape Big 4 
lobbying positions or whether their positions materially influence standards. Using textual 
analysis of comment letters to measure lobbying positions on FASB exposure drafts, I seek 
to provide such evidence. I find that Big 4 lobbying positions reflect incentives to increase 
fee-generating work and maintain client relationships, and that Big 4 support for fee-
increasing proposals is constrained by client opposition. Big 4 lobbying positions are 
significantly associated with standard setting outcomes, both in isolation as well as relative 
to other FASB constituents, including financial statement preparers and users. My results 
indicate financial statement users are neither directly (via comment letter lobbying) nor 
indirectly (via Big 4 advocacy) influential in the comment letter phase of FASB due 
process. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The mission of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is “to provide 
useful information to investors and other users of financial reports” (FAF 2013). Despite 
the primacy of users in its mission, FASB due process is dominated by the four largest 
global accounting firms: Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC (Big 4). Big 4 representatives 
serve on FASB advisory groups and project working groups, work as FASB staff in 
residence, and even oversee FASB governance as trustees of the Financial Accounting 
Foundation (FAF). In addition, multiple FASB Board members are retired Big 4 partners 
and many of the FASB staff worked for Big 4 firms prior to joining the FASB.  
This high level of participation stems from two sources. First, engaging in the 
standard setting process provides Big 4 firms with substantial benefits at relatively low cost 
when compared to other FASB constituents. Operating in what Ramanna (2015) describes 
as a thin political market, the Big 4 have a concentrated commercial interest in accounting 
standards, which facilitates participation and coordination, while other constituents 
(particularly users) face relatively higher participation costs and more diffuse benefits. 
Second, seeking and incorporating Big 4 advice is an efficient response by FASB staff and 
Board members who require expertise and information in order to create effective policy 
(e.g., Calvert 1985; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Jiang, Wang, and Wangerin 2018). 
Because Big 4 firms both opine and consult on the accounting of the world’s largest 
companies, they are uniquely positioned to provide timely, relevant advice on the 
development and application of accounting standards. 
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Notwithstanding Big 4 firms’ significant participation in FASB standard setting 
processes and operations, there is no systematic evidence on: 1) the incentives that shape 
Big 4 lobbying positions on proposed FASB standards (exposure drafts) or 2) whether Big 
4 lobbying positions materially influence standard setting outcomes. This study seeks to 
provide answers to these two questions. By lobbying position I refer to the broad opinion 
of support vs. opposition expressed by FASB constituents on FASB proposals, rather than 
more specific preferences that are sometimes offered in lobbying documents (i.e., 
preferences for relevance over reliability or simplicity over complexity). 
Providing such evidence is important for several reasons. First, economic theory 
suggests that regulations are influenced by those who stand to benefit most from them, and 
that regulators may rationally select biased lobbying advice (e.g., Stigler 1971; Calvert 
1985). Accordingly, understanding Big 4 lobbying motivations and influence sheds light 
on the development of U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and 
answers Leuz and Wysocki’s (2016) call for evidence on “the process by which disclosure 
and reporting regulation arises.” 
Second, prior research provides limited and often conflicting evidence regarding 
the role of Big 4 firms in standard setting. Previous studies rely on researchers’ subjective 
assessments of support or opposition toward proposals (e.g., Puro 1984; MacArthur 1988; 
McKee, Williams, and Frazier 1991), or focus on auditor positions on a single qualitative 
accounting characteristic (e.g., Allen, Ramanna, and Roychowdhury 2018; Baudot, Huang, 
and Demek 2018). By analyzing multiple economic motivations both individually and in 
combination on a large sample of exposure drafts issued over several years, this study 
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provides evidence on what drives Big 4 lobbying more broadly and how different 
incentives interact.  
Third, while Big 4 firms have the potential for significant influence, the FASB’s 
primary constituent is financial statement users (FASB 2010). However, users have a 
notoriously low rate of participation in standard setting (e.g., Weetman, Davie, and Collins 
1996), leading some to question the extent of their influence in accounting rulemaking (e.g. 
Young 2006). Examining Big 4 incentives and lobbying positions relative to those of users 
sheds light on whether Big 4 firms lobbying positions correspond to the FASB’s mission. 
Finally, my study is the first of which I am aware to systematically examine the standard 
setting consequences of comment letter lobbying, which I analyze for Big 4 firms in 
isolation as well as relative to other constituents. Broad evidence on how comment letter 
lobbying impacts standard setting outcomes is informative about the effectiveness of FASB 
due process.  
I develop and test three competing, yet non-mutually exclusive, theories identified 
from prior accounting, economics, and political science research to examine whether 
theorized motivations affect Big 4 positions generally, whether one dominates, and how 
the incentives interact. I outline the three theories—the make-work theory, the client 
theory, and the user theory—below. 
The make-work theory predicts Big 4 firms support exposure drafts that would, if 
adopted, increase demand for audit and consulting services from more firms, because such 
standards lead directly to higher fees (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1982; Puro 1984). The 
client theory predicts Big 4 firms support standards preferred by clients. As agents of audit 
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clients, Big 4 firms may favor standards that benefit clients because such benefits are 
passed on through maintained client relationships and reduced risk of auditor switches 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). Finally, the user theory 
predicts Big 4 firms aim to enhance capital market efficiency by supporting standards that 
provide users with the best information for decision-making, consistent with regulators’ 
statements on the role of auditors as gatekeepers of capital market integrity (e.g., White 
2015; Harris 2016).  
To test these three theories, I develop proxies to measure whether: 1) exposure 
drafts will likely increase demand for Big 4 services (make-work theory), 2) Big 4 clients 
support the exposure draft (client theory), and 3) financial statement users support the 
exposure draft (user theory). I then examine how Big 4 lobbying positions vary with these 
proxies. I measure lobbying positions of Big 4 firms, as well as those of clients, users, and 
other constituents, as the tone of comment letters submitted in response to FASB exposure 
drafts. Tone is computed using positive and negative words from the Loughran and 
McDonald (2014—LM) dictionary, with more positive (negative) tone indicating relatively 
more (less) support. While prior studies rely on researchers’ subjective assessments of 
constituent support or opposition toward a proposal, tone is more transparent, objective, 
and scalable, and can be consistently applied across exposure drafts and comment letters. 
I contextually modify the dictionary by removing standard- and proposal-specific 
accounting words, and additionally perform several tests to ensure construct validity.   
I first examine the extent to which the three theories outlined above influence Big 
4 lobbying positions. I find that Big 4 comment letter tone is positively associated with 
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proposed expansions of work-increasing elements in FASB exposure drafts. Work-
increasing elements are proposed changes to implementation guidance, weighted by the 
proportion of firms that would be affected by the exposure draft. The FASB (2002) and 
SEC (2003) indicate implementation guidance increases the complexity of GAAP, and 
research suggests interpretive guidance is associated with greater difficulty of application 
and more audit work (e.g., Donelson, Folsom, McInnis, Mergenthaler, and Peterson 2016). 
This evidence supports the make-work theory. I also find a positive association between 
the tone of Big 4 comment letters and the average tone of their clients’ comment letters on 
the same exposure draft, supporting the client theory. Finally, I find no association between 
Big 4 comment letter tone and the average tone of users, suggesting Big 4 lobbying 
positions are not associated with capital market views.  
Evidence from a joint test combining all theory variables indicates support of 
similar economic and statistical magnitudes for both the make-work and client theories. I 
further explore the interaction of these two incentives and find that the positive relation 
between work-increasing exposure drafts and Big 4 comment letter tone is concentrated in 
exposure drafts for which client support is high. In other words, the evidence suggests that 
Big 4 support for work-increasing standards is constrained by client opposition. Results of 
supplemental tests suggest litigation risk does not explain Big 4 support for work-
increasing standards. 
I next examine how Big 4 positions affect standard setting outcomes. Reliance on 
experts is an important component of FASB due process (Jiang et al. 2018). Although Big 
4 firms likely have the most experience in any standard setting application, the economic 
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incentives and lobbying behavior of other constituents could either mask or constrain their 
influence on final accounting standards. For example, the FASB’s conceptual framework 
explains the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information “that 
is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making 
decisions” (FASB 2010), suggesting user positions arguably should drive changes in 
accounting standards. On the other hand, since preparers arguably face the most 
asymmetric cost function with respect to changes in accounting standards, they are the 
loudest voice and may thus drive GAAP changes (e.g., McKay and Yackee 2007).  
To test the absolute and relative influence of Big 4 lobbying positions on standard 
setting outcomes, I construct three measures to capture FASB responses to constituent 
lobbying: 1) the magnitude of content changes from exposure draft to final standard using 
textual similarity of the two documents (e.g., Haeder and Yackee 2015; Lang and Stice-
Lawrence 2015); 2) whether a project “fails” (i.e., is removed from the FASB agenda 
following the comment letter period); and 3) the time between exposure draft and final 
standard issuance. I then estimate the association between these outcome measures and the 
average tone of comment letters from each major FASB constituent group. 
I find a significantly negative association between average Big 4 comment letter 
tone and content changes from the exposure draft to the final standard, suggesting that 
when Big 4 firms support (oppose) an exposure draft, the FASB generally makes fewer 
(more) changes to the standard. Big 4 tone is also significantly negatively associated with 
project failure, indicating Big 4 opposition is a factor in FASB decisions to abandon agenda 
projects. Finally, I find a significantly negative association between Big 4 tone and time 
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from exposure draft to final standard, suggesting Big 4 opposition is associated with 
meaningful delays in final standard issuance. In terms of relative influence, average Big 4 
tone is more strongly associated with standard setting outcomes than comment letter tone 
of other constituent groups, including users and other auditors, except for in tests of delay, 
where average preparer tone weakly dominates. Collectively, tests of standard setting 
outcomes suggest Big 4 firms’ lobbying positions have a statistically strong 
correspondence with meaningful FASB consequences, and this correspondence is stronger 
relative to the lobbying positions of other constituents. I find no relation between user tone 
and outcomes in any of my tests, suggesting user comment letter views are not a significant 
input in developing final accounting standards. 
This study contributes to the literature on the political process underlying 
accounting standards development in two primary ways. First, by examining comment 
letters on 80 exposure drafts issued over 15 years, I provide broad evidence that Big 4 
firms’ positions are associated with both their incentive to increase the amount of audit and 
consulting work they provide and agreeing with client positions, with client positions 
apparently constraining Big 4 support for work-increasing proposals.  
 Second, I provide the first systematic evidence on the influence of various FASB 
constituent groups on standard setting outcomes. My results indicate Big 4 firm lobbying 
positions are significantly associated with the amount and timing of change in FASB 
standards and the likelihood of a FASB project failing, and are generally more strongly 
related to outcomes relative to lobbying positions of other constituents. One notable finding 
is that, contrary to the conceptual preeminence of users in the FASB mission, I observe no 
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evidence that financial statement users’ views directly relate to standard setting outcomes 
or that user views are incorporated into Big 4 lobbying positions. These results have 
implications for standard setters who must incorporate Big 4 lobbying input in developing 
accounting standards, as well as for academics and financial statement users seeking to 
understand the process by which financial reporting regulation arises. 
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Chapter 2: Background and Prior Literature 
2.1. Background 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) legal authority to establish financial accounting standards in the U.S. 
However, the SEC has historically delegated this accounting rulemaking authority to the 
private sector. Prior to the FASB, authoritative accounting standards were issued by the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB), a committee formed and overseen by the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), a professional organization of 
practicing public accountants.1 Membership in and control of the APB was dominated by 
representatives from the large audit firms (then the “Big 8”), with additional membership 
usually from smaller audit firms and business executives (Sprouse and Vagts 1965; Zeff 
2007a). Only one professional financial statement user ever served on the APB, and he 
joined in 1971, two years before the APB was dissolved (Zeff 2007a).2 
Through the 1960s and into the 1970s the APB experienced a “crisis of confidence” 
(Zeff 2015), wherein the SEC increasingly intervened in APB rulemaking to correct 
deficiencies in existing rules or APB proposals, generally on behalf of financial statement 
users and the public interest (Zeff 2007b; 2018). In 1971 the AICPA addressed the growing 
tension between the SEC and the accounting profession by appointing the Wheat 
                                                 
1 The Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP) set accounting standards until the establishment of the 
APB in 1959. In the case of the CAP, the founding and initial oversight organization was the American 
Institute of Accountants (AIA), the immediate predecessor of the AICPA. 
2 The absence of financial statement users on the APB was likely partly due to the requirement that APB 
members be Certified Public Accountants (CPAs), a designation required only for licensed public accounting 
practitioners (i.e., generally auditors or tax professionals). 
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Commission on Establishment of Accounting Principles (Wheat Study) to recommend 
alternative models for the development of financial accounting standards (Establishing 
Financial Accounting Standards 1972). The Wheat Study considered suggestions ranging 
from de-privatization of standard setting to slight modifications of the extant APB 
structure.  
The Wheat Study recommendations ultimately led to the establishment of the 
FASB in 1973 as a private organization with authority to promulgate GAAP. The FAF was 
concurrently established to oversee the FASB’s administration, finances, and 
membership.3 Relative to earlier standard setting bodies with inherent practitioner-driven 
objectives, the FASB has historically maintained a more diverse representation and a 
distinct focus on how financial reporting information is used. As an example, its mission 
statement describes the FASB purpose “to establish and improve financial accounting and 
reporting standards to provide useful information to investors and other users of financial 
reports…” (FAF 2013).  
The institutions surrounding accounting standard setting have changed 
considerably since the founding of the FASB. The large accounting firms were reduced in 
number from eight in 1973, to six in 1990, to five in 1999 and, finally, to four in 2002 
(Allen et al. 2018). This concentration was facilitated by both merger and acquisition 
activity within the group, as well as the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002 resulting from 
                                                 
3 The Wheat Study recommendation gave substantial power to the AICPA to select FAF trustees, likely to 
avoid alienating the AICPA after removing its standard-setting authority (Zeff 2015). For example, the initial 
nine-member board of FAF trustees consisted of the AICPA president and four practicing CPAs, thus 
securing a majority of trustee votes for the profession. FAF membership requirements have changed 
substantially over time.  
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its association with the Enron scandal. This concentration has likely led to Big 4 incentives 
with regard to standard setting becoming starker. Over the same time period, financial 
statement users have come to expect financial reporting of greater volume and frequency 
(e.g. Li 2008; Lang and Stice-Lawrence 2015; McMullin, Miller, and Twedt 2018).  
The high level of participation of Big 4 firms in standard setting activities suggests 
the concentration of large auditors has outweighed any impact of changing user 
expectations on FASB technical operations. Despite the primacy of financial statement 
users in its mission, FASB due process is dominated by the Big 4 firms. Senior partners of 
Big 4 firms serve on FASB advisory groups and frequently work for the FASB as rotational 
staff (FASB n.d.). Through their participation in the Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), 
senior Big 4 partners develop accounting guidance that, if ratified by the FASB Board, is 
codified as US GAAP. They also provide oversight, with at least one FAF trustee selected 
from a global leadership position in a Big 4 firm.4 Additionally, at least two members of 
the FASB board are usually retired Big 4 partners and many of the FASB technical staff 
were employed by Big 4 firms prior to joining the FASB.  
This procedural dominance likely stems from two sources. First, from the 
perspective of the Big 4, participation in the standard setting process provides significant 
potential benefits at relatively low cost. The Big 4 thus benefit from a collective action 
problem whereby their concentrated commercial interest in accounting standards facilitates 
                                                 
4 Although not a formal requirement, a representative from at least one of the Big 4 firms with the title of 
Chairman and/or Chief Executive Officer has served as a member of the FAF since at least 2000, the date at 
which annual reports are available on the FAF website. 
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coordination and participation, while other constituents (particularly users) face relatively 
higher participation costs and more diffuse benefits (Ramanna 2015). Second, from the 
FASB’s perspective, seeking and incorporating Big 4 advice is a predictable and rational 
response to a need for expertise (Calvert 1985; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Jiang et al. 
2018). Because Big 4 firms both opine and consult on the accounting practices of the 
world’s largest companies, they are uniquely positioned to provide timely, relevant advice 
on the development and application of accounting standards. 
2.2. FASB Rulemaking Process 
The rulemaking process at the FASB relies heavily on constituent input.5 The 
typical life cycle of a FASB standard-setting project begins with a research phase wherein 
the FASB works with constituents (often facilitated by its advisory groups) to identify 
deficiencies in GAAP. If the FASB Board determines that correcting an identified 
deficiency is likely to provide sufficient benefit at sufficiently low cost, the Board adds a 
project to its technical agenda. The FASB staff then researches the agenda issue, 
incorporating formal discussions with project-specific working groups as well as informal 
discussions with subject matter experts in the field, in order to propose alternative 
accounting treatments to the FASB Board.  
Once FASB members have voted on available alternatives, the FASB staff 
compiles the preliminary decisions into an exposure draft formally soliciting written 
                                                 
5 See the FASB Rules of Procedure (FAF 2013) for detailed requirements of FASB due process and Miller, 
Bahnson, and Redding (2016) for a broader discussion of the topic. 
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comments from constituents.6 The time between exposure draft issuance and comment 
letter due date can be 25 days or less for narrow amendments or 60 days or more for more 
significant amendments to GAAP.7 After the comment period, the FASB Board conducts 
additional deliberations and issues a final standard. Prior to the introduction of the 
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) in 2009, this process resulted in the issuance of 
final accounting standards in the form of a Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
(SFAS), FASB Interpretation (FINs), or FASB Staff Position (FSP). Sometimes Technical 
Bulletins (TBs), which carried lesser authority in the case of conflicting guidance, were 
issued. The EITF also issued “consensuses” with lesser GAAP authority than TBs.  
In 2009 all authoritative GAAP guidance was consolidated into the ASC. All final 
standards issued by the FASB are Accounting Standards Updates (ASUs) that amend the 
ASC. The FASB explains “An Update is not itself authoritative; rather, it is a document 
that explains how the [ASC] has been amended” (FAF 2013). All ASUs have equal 
authority and there are no longer distinctions between usual due process standards such as 
SFASs and staff-initiated standards like FSPs. Additionally, the EITF still deliberates and 
comes to consensuses on emerging accounting issues, but their consensuses are now issued 
as ASUs with the same weight and authority as other ASUs. Despite their different 
authoritative weight and underlying process relative to SFASs, the FASB conducts the 
                                                 
6 FASB due process rules require issuing an exposure draft before a final standard, but other documents are 
occasionally issued if the FASB deems additional constituent input necessary. 
7 The FASB appears to generally ere on the side of longer comment periods—the mean (median) comment 
period for the 80 exposure drafts in my sample is 76 (67) days. 
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same amount of both formal and informal constituent outreach under the ASC regime. For 
convenience, I refer to ASUs as final standards throughout the study.8 
This paper focuses on the comment letter period between exposure draft and final 
standard, as this is the only publicly observable portion of FASB due process. However, 
Big 4 involvement is pervasive and dominant throughout the standard-setting process.9 
Understanding the motivations that shape Big 4 firms’ lobbying positions in comment 
letters is thus informative for understanding FASB decision-making more broadly. It is 
also important from a historical context to determine whether the public-interest emphasis 
on which the FASB was founded guides accounting standard development. If, on the 
contrary, FASB rules are determined by the accounting profession with little regard for 
interests of investors and other financial statement users, the implication may be that the 
APB model of public accountant reliance has continued through the FASB era. 
2.3. Prior Literature 
Researchers have applied several different policy-making models to understand 
FASB standard setting (see Gipper et al. 2013 for a review). Some suggest the FASB 
follows a public interest model (e.g., Posner 1974) and makes decisions to maximize social 
welfare, consistent with the premise on which the FASB was founded.10 Others argue the 
                                                 
8 Because the ASC organization precludes simple categorization of standards based on authority, I make 
several adjustments to the post-ASC sample based on project origination and purpose. This is explained in 
detail in Section 5.1. 
9 My inability to observe Big 4 firms’ “quiet” lobbying efforts both before and after the public exposure 
period likely leads to my underestimating the impact of Big 4 firms on the standard setting process. 
10 Consistent with the discussion in Sunder (1988), Gipper et al. (2013), and Ramanna (2015), it is difficult 
for the FASB to know which rules maximize welfare and what frictions prevent market forces from achieving 
it without FASB intervention. 
 15 
FASB is captured by firms or individuals directing accounting rules for their own interests 
(e.g., Ramanna 2015). Ball (2009) argues market-based solutions were effective until the 
SEC and FASB began promulgating rules-based and compliance-centric GAAP. FASB 
members’ actions are also potentially guided by personal ideologies (i.e., conservative or 
pro-fair value), so that GAAP is a product of the ideological composition of the FASB 
(Allen and Ramanna 2013).  
Regardless of the policy lens adopted, the FASB is subject to market demands and 
influential constituents. While many raise alarms about the adverse consequences of 
special interest influence (e.g., Ramanna 2008, 2015; Zeff 2002, 2005), another view 
suggests FASB interactions with prominent constituents reflects the importance of 
expertise and information (e.g., Jiang et al. 2018).  
Big 4 firms dominate constituent participation in FASB processes prior to exposure 
draft issuance (Gipper et al. 2013). For example, agenda priorities of the FASB are set by 
advisory groups on which Big 4 firms play important roles and by Big 4 firms themselves 
(Leftwich 1995; Allen 2014; Jiang et al. 2018). Most prior research on FASB lobbying is 
in the comment letter phase, and typically focuses on preparers’ incentives relative to a 
particular proposed standard (e.g., Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1996; Yen, Hirst, and 
Hopkins 2007; Ramanna 2008; Hodder and Hopkins 2014).  
Brown (1981) was the first study to systematically identify positions and 
preferences of various constituents interacting with the FASB. Brown’s study was novel in 
many ways, including: the use of discussion memoranda (as opposed to exposure drafts) 
as neutral documents to analyze constituents’ “unbiased” preferences; the explicit 
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consideration of multidimensionality in constituents’ policy preferences;11 and a novel 
methodology to measure constituent and FASB position. Perhaps the most important 
innovation in Brown (1981) is his use of changes from discussion memorandum to final 
standard as a measure of changes in FASB internal positions or decision-making. The 
present study is in many ways an extension of Brown’s analysis. For example, I examine 
the multidimensional nature of the lobbying incentives of Big 4 firms, and use textual 
changes from exposure to final standard to capture changes in FASB position. However, 
this study differs from Brown (1981) in its focus on various incentives of Big 4 firms as 
the dominant constituent group, as well as its explicit comparison of Big 4 positions’ 
associations with meaningful standard setting outcomes relative to the positions of other 
constituent groups. 
Although this study focuses on incentives of Big 4 firms (i.e., as distinct from 
auditors more generally), the prior literature on auditor lobbying on proposed accounting 
standards is most closely aligned with this study. However, as noted by Gipper et al. (2013), 
research in this area is scarce and often yields conflicting conclusions. Prior research on 
auditor lobbying is mainly interested in auditor-client agreement on FASB proposed 
standards. Haring (1979) hypothesizes a positive relation between client and auditor 
preferences, but finds no significant association in a sample of seven proposals. He 
concludes concerns about auditor independence in influencing regulation (e.g., Metcalf 
                                                 
11 The lack of user participation in FASB due process is apparent at the time of Brown’s study as well, with 
only one of the 27 respondents with sufficient participation to be included in the study representing user 
interests. 
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Report-US Congress 1976) are exaggerated. MacArthur (1988) hypothesizes a similar 
relationship, but fails to detect an association. In a SFAS 86 case study, McKee, Williams 
and Frazier (1991) find an association between client and auditor views, but only when 
clients are experienced lobbyists.  
Watts and Zimmerman (1982) analyze auditor lobbying on six proposed standards 
and find results suggesting that while auditors generally lobby consistent with client 
interests, auditor incentives for more fees is also associated with lobbying positions. They 
find support for both incentives. Puro (1984) finds similar results, also in a small sample 
of six proposals. Due to their research designs, neither Watts and Zimmerman nor Puro 
distinguish whether self-interest or client-facing incentives are dominant. Moreover, due 
to the use of small, non-overlapping samples, prior results are context-specific and thus 
may not generalize or distinguish between auditors’ self-interest and client-facing 
incentives.  
I am aware of three studies examining Big 4 (or Big “N” for earlier periods) 
comment letter lobbying explicitly. First, Puro (1985) tabulates within-group agreement 
among Big 4 firms using data from Puro (1984), and finds no evidence of collusion. Allen 
et al. (2018) conduct a longitudinal study of Big 4 lobbying for relevance vs. reliability in 
a large sample of exposure drafts issued over many years. They find that heightened 
litigation risk over time and increasing agreement with standard setters’ fair value 
preferences are associated with comment letter mentions of reliability, but client 
preferences are not. In a recent study, Baudot et al. (2018) qualitatively examine Big 4 
comment letters as a way to contextualize accounting complexity. They conclude that Big 
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4 firms discuss complexity in many different ways and in most of their comment letters. 
They additionally find Big 4 firms oppose FASB proposals that increase complexity, but 
do not reconcile this result to prior literature (Watts and Zimmerman 1982; Puro 1984).12  
Research on the outcomes of standard setting lobbying is even sparser. Buckmaster 
et al. (1994) find no association between lobbying positions of multiple constituents and 
outcomes of seven exposure drafts—a result they acknowledge could be due to 
insurmountable research design issues. Hansen (2011) finds in a sample of five due process 
documents that lobbying success before the IASB depends on lobbyist expertise, 
credibility, and financial contributions to the IASB. And McLeay et al. (2000) find preparer 
dominance in the implementation of a European financial reporting directive into German 
law.  
This study differs from and complements prior work in several ways. First, whereas 
prior research focuses on either issue-specific lobbying on a small number of proposals 
(e.g., Puro 1984; McKee et al. 1991) or time-series variation along a single conceptual 
dimension of accounting (Allen et al. 2018), my empirical approach incorporates all 
significant exposure drafts over the entire sample period of 2002 to 2016 to be broadly 
informative on the determinants of Big 4 accounting firm support or opposition. Second, 
rather than categorizing firm comments as “for” or “against,” my analysis of letters’ textual 
features captures variation in Big 4 firms’ views and thus has the potential to provide a 
                                                 
12 Complexity in Baudot et al. (2018) is conceptually similar to this study’s make-work theory. However, 
significant differences in how each study operationalizes this construct make comparisons difficult. Whereas 
Baudot et al. define complexity using Big 4 comments and do not consider the proposed standards’ impact, 
I define complexity using characteristics of the exposure draft and weight each exposure draft observation 
by the breadth of its expected impact on public companies using data from Compustat. 
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more nuanced understanding of their lobbying positions. And finally, to my knowledge 
this is the first study providing systematic evidence on the standard setting outcomes of 
lobbying by Big 4 firms, both in absolute terms as well as relative to other constituent 
groups. 
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Chapter 3: Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Determinants of Big 4 Lobbying Positions 
Big 4 accounting firms are complex, global organizations facing multiple 
incentives when lobbying on proposed accounting standards. The influence of a single 
incentive is unlikely to be evident in a comment letter without simultaneous evidence of 
other motivations. Nonetheless, aggregation of different incentives into broad categories 
that align with potential motivations is useful for testing the existence and relative 
importance of the different incentives. I classify incentives of Big 4 firms to take lobbying 
positions before the FASB into three competing, non-mutually exclusive theories. These 
theories are competing in the sense that the null hypothesis underlying each theory is based 
both on theory-specific considerations and importantly on the other two theories’ 
alternative hypotheses. They are non-mutually exclusive in the sense that each motivation 
is inherently based on Big 4 firms’ profit motive, and each theory describes a different 
channel for increasing or maintaining profits. 
3.1.1. Make-work Theory 
Since Big 4 firms’ chief revenue source is audit fees from opining on clients’ 
application of GAAP, it follows that they are motivated to influence GAAP to increase 
audit fees. Big 4 firms also have large and growing consulting practices (Financial Times 
2015; Deloitte 2016; EY 2016; KPMG 2016; PWC 2016), which similarly affects 
incentives to shape GAAP to increase demand for professional services. Big 4 firms stand 
to benefit from regulatory and accounting standard developments in particular in the U.S. 
where, despite independence rules ushered in by Sarbanes-Oxley, public companies rely 
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heavily on their auditors for assistance in implementing new rules (McKenna 2017). This 
is consistent with rent-seeking behavior by those standing to benefit from regulation 
(Stigler 1971). Increased fees are most likely when amendments to GAAP are difficult to 
apply (Watts and Zimmerman 1982). Application difficulty also represents a barrier to 
entry for smaller competitors.   
 Exposure drafts outline how existing guidance will be amended if the exposure 
draft’s provisions are adopted as a final standard. If application is expected to be 
sufficiently difficult, exposure drafts propose providing implementation guidance, which 
details how to account for an item, as well as examples of application. I assume changes to 
implementation guidance are indicative of both the existence of a change in what firms are 
required to do, as well as the difficulty of applying the change. This is consistent with 
regulatory statements that implementation guidance indicates complexity (FASB 2002; 
SEC 2003) and with empirical evidence in Donelson et al. (2016) showing an association 
between audit fees and interpretive guidance.13  
Big 4 firms may additionally want to increase complexity as a shield from litigation 
risk. For example, Allen et al. (2018) find an association between temporal changes in 
auditor litigation and Big 4 lobbying for reliability, and Donelson, McInnis, and 
Mergenthaler (2012) find that rules-based standards (which are partly defined by high 
levels of implementation guidance) are associated with lower incidence of shareholder 
                                                 
13 I confirm that implementation guidance changes are associated with increased audit fees in a supplemental 
test described in Section 5.1.1. 
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litigation. I attempt to distinguish between work-increasing and litigation-decreasing 
incentives in Section 5.5.2. 
3.1.2. Client Theory 
Under an agency view of the relationship between Big 4 firms and their audit 
clients, managers may influence their auditors’ lobbying positions on proposed GAAP 
amendments through their power to hire and fire them. Thus, Big 4 firms may lobby for 
standards that benefit clients because this likely helps build and maintain client 
relationships and reduce the risk of auditor switches. Moreover, due to growth in Big 4 
firms’ consulting practices, this incentive likely extends beyond audit clients and thus also 
predicts that Big 4 firms side with large preparers that are either current or potential 
consulting clients. This incentive has received most of the attention of prior auditor 
lobbying research, which was largely concerned with a perceived auditor independence 
problem (e.g., Haring 1979; Watts and Zimmerman 1982; MacArthur 1988; McKee et al. 
1991). Results of prior research are also mixed, with no clear answer on whether auditor 
and client lobbying positions align. 
3.1.3. User Theory 
As gatekeepers of capital market integrity (e.g., White 2015; Harris 2016), Big 4 
firms may support accounting standards leading to financial statements that better reflect 
firms’ underlying economics. This is consistent with Big 4 firms supporting the FASB’s 
mission of promulgating financial accounting standards that increase the decision 
usefulness of accounting information. Under this view, accounting standards that lead to 
less informative financial reports could decrease demand for audit and consulting services 
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by reducing the value of an audit and of compliance with GAAP. On the other hand, if 
GAAP is viewed as leading to more informative financial reports, the value of audit and 
consulting services that encourage compliance with GAAP will increase. All else equal, 
Big 4 firms should prefer more informative standards because adopting such standards 
increases or maintains demand for audit and consulting services and thus benefits the 
profession.  
This view is expressed in some Big 4 firm comment letters’ mentions of the 
anticipated impact of adopting an exposure draft on financial statement users. In a recent 
example, Deloitte commented that “the classification of deferred taxes under existing 
GAAP does not provide useful information to users...” (Deloitte 2015). Similar references 
to the impact on financial statement users are common in Big 4 comment letters. 
Three hypotheses, stated in the null, emerge from the discussion in Sections 3.1.1 
through 3.1.3 on the determinants of Big 4 lobbying positions: 
H1: Big 4 accounting firms do not lobby in support of proposals that will increase 
demand for audit and consulting services. 
H2: Big 4 accounting firms do not lobby in support of proposals supported by their 
clients. 
H3: Big 4 accounting firms do not lobby in support of proposals supported by 
financial statement users. 
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3.2. Standard Setting Outcomes 
I next form testable hypotheses about the absolute and relative association between 
Big 4 positions and standard setting outcomes. The FASB’s conceptual framework states 
the objective of general purpose financial reporting is to provide information “that is useful 
to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making decisions” (FASB 
2010). The centrality of users is echoed in the FASB’s mission statement to “establish and 
improve standards of financial accounting and reporting that foster financial reporting by 
nongovernmental entities that provides decision-useful information to investors and other 
users of financial reports” (FAF 2013). Given the preeminence of financial statement users, 
user lobbying positions arguably should drive changes in accounting standards.  
However, it is possible that financial statement preparers are most influential in 
steering standard setting activities. Preparers asymmetrically bear observable and 
quantifiable costs of standard setting, with fewer obvious or easily measurable benefits 
through, for example, reduced cost of capital. New standards require preparers to update 
systems, train personnel, and incur audit-related costs. Accordingly, preparers are the most 
vocal participants in the standard setting process (Hodder and Hopkins 2014). Their 
comment letters far outnumber those of other individual constituent groups and, consistent 
with research on regulatory agency lobbying (e.g., McKay and Yackee 2007), greater 
volume could lead to greater influence. 
On the other hand, because FASB board members’ individual areas of expertise 
may collectively lack the breadth or depth required to promulgate effective standards, 
reliance on experts for information is an important component of FASB due process (Jiang 
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et al. 2018). Theory suggests that regulators rationally rely on experts’ biased advice, even 
when they are aware of and cannot undo the bias (Calvert 1985; Austen-Smith and Wright 
1992). Since their audit and consulting businesses face accounting issues from virtually the 
entire economy, Big 4 firms are likely the foremost experts on any topic facing the FASB, 
suggesting their input may be most influential.  
Constituent influence in FASB due process is likely to be evident in the extent of 
changes from exposure draft to final standard, the likelihood of exposure drafts being 
finalized, and the amount of resources and time required to finalize standards. Given their 
level of expertise and pervasiveness in FASB operations, I expect Big 4 accounting firms 
to influence standard setting outcomes and to be more influential relative to other 
constituent groups. However, these expectations are not tested in prior research and are 
empirical matters, leading to the below hypotheses, stated in the null: 
H4: Big 4 accounting firm lobbying positions do not influence standard setting 
outcomes. 
H5: Relative to lobbying positions of other FASB constituents, Big 4 accounting 
firm lobbying positions do not have a greater influence on standard setting 
outcomes. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Design 
4.1. Determinants of Big 4 Lobbying Positions 
I use comment letters written in response to exposure drafts to measure Big 4 
lobbying position for several reasons. First, comment letters are typically the only 
observable interaction between the FASB and Big 4 firms, and the Big 4 comment on 
virtually all exposure drafts. 14 Second, the observable nature of comment letters likely 
precludes Big 4 firms from taking misleading positions in comment letters relative to 
positions taken privately with the FASB. Finally, prior research concludes comment letters 
are representative of constituent views (e.g., Kelly 1985; Hodder and Hopkins 2014).  
Testing my hypotheses requires a proxy for lobbying positions. Early studies 
measured position by hand coding letters as supportive or opposed (e.g., Brown 1981; 
Watts and Zimmerman 1982; Puro 1984, 1985). However, coding comment letters on 
multiple exposure drafts over many years presents several challenges. First, commenters 
rarely state unequivocal positions, instead describing nuanced viewpoints on multiple 
changes proposed by the exposure draft. Second, developing a uniform coding rubric 
applicable to all exposure drafts is likely not feasible due to significant variation in the 
number and significance of proposed GAAP amendments in each exposure draft.15 Finally, 
hand coding all comment letters required for my analyses is prohibitively costly. While 
                                                 
14 I focus on exposure drafts in this study because exposure drafts (as opposed to Discussion Memoranda or 
Preliminary Views documents) are a) more uniform in their format and solicitation of constituent feedback, 
and b) more indicative of the FASB’s intent to issue a final standard. 
15 This limitation appears to be earlier researchers’ motivation for studying small samples of FASB exposure 
drafts on which a clear support-vs.-oppose dimension could be identified (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1982; 
Puro 1984). 
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testing H1 requires position measures for 316 Big 4 comment letters, testing H2 and H3 
requires scores for 5,228 preparer and 390 user comment letters, and testing H4 and H5 
requires scores for 16,994 comment letters.  
Given these complexities, I rely on text analysis to measure lobbying positions.16 
My primary measure is Tone, defined at the comment letter level, as the number of positive 
words minus the number of negative words, divided by the sum of positive plus negative 
words. Positive and negative words are defined using the Loughran and McDonald (2014—
LM) dictionary after contextually modifying it by removing standard- and proposal-
specific accounting words that are germane to the applicable document, and are not used 
in order to convey support or opposition.17 This measure has several advantages over hand 
coding. First, Tone is continuous from -1 to 1, which allows for more variation than 
dichotomous variables. Second, calculating Tone is scalable and can be done easily for all 
comment letters in my sample. Third, Tone can also be computed for exposure drafts to 
which the comment letters respond, which allows controlling for exposure draft features 
that could induce spurious correlation between the exposure draft and the comment letter 
position. As examples, I include two excerpts from Big 4 comment letters in Appendix A. 
                                                 
16 Allen et al. (2018) come to a similar conclusion, and rely on counting the number of words before and 
after the first instance of the word stem reliab* to establish their measure of the importance of relevance-
reliability tradeoffs. 
17 Specifically, I remove the words “disclose,” “disclosed,” “discloses,” “disclosing,” “defined benefit,” 
“effective date,” “effective control,” “going concern,” “troubled debt restructuring,” and “loss contingency,” 
because these terms or words within them convey meaning according to the LM dictionary, but are used in 
the context of FASB documents and comment letters to describe accounting topics. 
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Despite these advantages, a concern that a human reader and software could come 
to opposite conclusions potentially remains. I perform several validation tests to address 
this concern. These tests are discussed in Appendix B. 
To test H1 through H3 I estimate Models (1) through (4) at the comment letter level: 
Big4Toneij = 0 1Workj + 2ExDraftTonej + 3LnCLWordsij  
      + 4LnCLCountj + 5LnExDraftWordsj  + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj   
         + Big 4 FE + Year FE ij     (1) 
 
Big4Toneij = 0 1ClientToneij + 2ExDraftTonej + 3LnCLWordsij  
      + 4LnCLCountj + 5LnExDraftWordsj  + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj   
         +  Big 4 FE + Year FE ij     (2a) 
 
Big4Toneij = 0 1AllBig4ClientTonej + 2ExDraftTonej + 3LnCLWordsij  
      + 4LnCLCountj + 5LnExDraftWordsj  + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj   
         +  Big 4 FE + Year FE ij     (2b) 
 
Big4Toneij = 0 1UserTonej + 2ExDraftTonej + 3LnCLWordsij + 4LnCLCountj  
      + 5LnExDraftWordsj  + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj  + Big 4 FE  
      + Year FE ij       (3a) 
 
Big4Toneij = 0 1AffectedCARj + 2ExDraftTonej + 3LnCLWordsij  
      + 4LnCLCountj + 5LnExDraftWordsj  + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj   
         + Big 4 FE + Year FE ij     (3b) 
 
Big4Toneij = 0 1Workj 2ClientToneij 3UserTonej + 4ExDraftTonej  
      + 5LnCLWordsij + 6LnCLCountj + 7LnExDraftWordsj   
         + 8LnAgendaExDraftDaysj  + Big 4 FE + Year FE ij (4) 
 
 
where Big4Toneij is the tone of Big 4 firm i's comment letter submitted in response to 
exposure draft j. All variables are defined in Appendix C. 
Workj is defined at the exposure draft level as IGParagraphs, the count of the 
number paragraphs of implementation guidance the exposure draft would change (i.e., add, 
amend, or supersede) plus one, weighted by Ubiquity, the proportion of Compustat firms 
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likely to be affected if the exposure draft were finalized and adopted.18 I weight by Ubiquity 
to capture the total shift in demand for professional services if the proposed changes were 
finalized and adopted. For example, if Big 4 accounting firms support standards that lead 
to greater demand for audit and consulting services, as in H1, they are likely to support 
difficult-to-implement standards only if they affect a sizeable proportion of companies. A 
highly technical standard that would affect only a small number of companies is 
inconsistent with the make-work theory. To aid in economic interpretation, and to 
minimize the effects of noise and positive skewness, I rank this variable and convert it to 
be on the same scale as other independent variables of interest [-1,1] using the following 
transformation: ( 2 x [ (rank – 1) / (N – 1) ] – 1 ).19 A positive 1 on Work from estimating 
Model (1) would be consistent with rejecting H1.  
ClientToneij is the average tone of comment letters across all audit clients of Big 4 
firm i on exposure draft j. A positive 1 on ClientTone from Model (2a) would be consistent 
with rejecting H2, or in other words with Big 4 firms supporting exposure drafts supported 
by their audit clients. For robustness, and also because Big 4 firms likely view all large 
preparers as potential customers of their audit and consulting services, I also estimate 
                                                 
18 I follow Khan, Li, Rajgopal, and Venkatachalam (2018) to identify which firms are likely to be impacted 
by exposure draft j, except I focus on firms expected to be affected upon adoption, rather than an ex post 
approach. 
19 I am unable to establish robust criteria for identifying affected firms for 12 exposure drafts in my sample. 
I rank these exposure drafts by IGParagraphs (i.e., without considering Ubiquity) and place them at the 
bottom of the distribution outlined here. Results are slightly weaker if I assign all 12 exposure drafts uniform 
Work values of -1. 
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Model (2b) after replacing ClientTone with AllBig4ClientTone, the average tone of 
comment letters across all Big 4 audit clients, to test H2.20   
UserTonej is the average tone of comment letters submitted by all financial 
statement users and user-related professional organizations in response to exposure draft j. 
I define comment letters as from users when written by an investment firm, a credit rating 
agency, or an organization representing user interests. I exclude comment letters from 
banks because bank comment letters generally express a preparer viewpoint. The top 
commenting users (and number of comment letters written) under my classification scheme 
were the CFA Institute (28); Blackrock Inc. (17); Fidelity Investments (15); the Investment 
Company Institute (14); Standard & Poor’s (13); and the Investors Technical Advisory 
Committee (13). A positive 1 on UserTone from Model (3a) would be consistent with 
rejecting H3, or in other words with Big 4 accounting firms supporting exposure drafts 
supported by financial statement users.  
As an additional test of H3, I also estimate Model (3b) where the independent 
variable of interest is AffectedCAR, the average three-day cumulative abnormal return of 
firms expected to be affected by exposure draft j’s proposed GAAP amendments. Returns 
are measured over the three-day window around exposure draft issuance and are calculated 
following Khan et al. (2018). I substitute AffectedCAR in the place of UserTone in Model 
(3b) to capture financial statement users’ revealed, as opposed to merely stated, 
                                                 
20 I use ClientTone as my primary variable of interest in Model (2a) because the audit client relationship 
represents a more demonstrable economic bond and, hence agency relationship, between the Big 4 firm and 
the preparer, whereas AllBig4ClientTone captures only presumed and/or potential economic bonds. However, 
ClientTone and AllBig4ClientTone are highly correlated (=0.857), suggesting it is unlikely their positions 
ever significantly differ. 
 31 
preferences. This avoids a situation wherein some financial statement users may not present 
their genuine preferences for proprietary or reputation-related reasons. For example, a sell-
side analyst using currently-disclosed information in her valuation model may refrain from 
publicly protesting a FASB proposal to eliminate the disclosure, because such protest 
would reveal her current use. In order to assess the relative importance of each incentive 
and provide further evidence on hypotheses H1 through H3, I additionally estimate Model 
(4), which has the same dependent and control variables as Models (1) through (3b), but 
includes the independent variables of interest from each of Models (1), (2a), and (3a). 
An important research design choice arises in situations where constituents do not 
comment. For example, there are 92 Big 4 comment letter observations where none of the 
Big 4 firm’s clients commented, and 22 exposure drafts with zero comment letters from 
users. In such situations, leaving Tone empty would eliminate many observations for 
empirical tests. I thus replace Tone with zero, on the rationale that if Tone captures 
comment letter position, which can vary from -1 to 1 (i.e., opposed to supportive), a value 
of zero represents a neutral position. This approach appears to bias against finding results—
inferences from untabulated results of affected tests are stronger if I replace with the sample 
median or leave empty—but is most justifiable given the construct Tone is intended to 
capture. 
The remaining variables in Models (1) through (4) control for factors expected to 
impact the association between Big 4 position and theorized incentives. ExDraftTonej, the 
Tone of exposure draft j, controls for variation in Tone induced by comment letters quoting 
words or passages from exposure draft j; LnCLWordsij controls for correlation between 
 32 
document tone and length; LnCLCountj controls for overall lobbying intensity on exposure 
draft j; LnExDraftWordsj controls for correlation between Tone and exposure draft length; 
and LnAgendaExDraftDaysj controls for any correlation between length of time between 
Big 4 support and the length of time between a project being added to the FASB agenda 
and exposure draft issuance. Big 4 fixed effects control for time- and exposure draft-
invariant characteristics of letters written by each firm. Year fixed effects control for the 
potential effects of unobservable market-wide phenomena that could impact Big4Tone. 
Standard errors are clustered at the exposure draft level. 
4.2. Standard Setting Outcomes 
To test H4 and H5, I estimate Models (5) through (7) below at the exposure draft 
level: 
GAAPj = 0 + 1Tonej + 2ExDraftTonej 3LnCLCountj 
   4LnExDraftWordsj + 5LnFSWordsj + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj 
   + Year FE + j        (5) 
 
ProjectFailj = f ( 0 + 1Tonej + 2ExDraftTonej 3LnCLCountj  
         4LnExDraftWordsj + 5LnAgendaExDraftDaysj  
         + Year FE + j )       (6) 
 
LnDaystoFSj = 0 + 1Tonej + 2ExDraftTonej 3LnCLCountj  
4LnExDraftWordsj + 5LnFSWordsj + 6LnAgendaExDraftDaysj  
+Year FE + j        (7) 
 
 
where the independent variable of interest, Tonej, is the average Tone of all comment letters 
submitted in response to exposure draft j by an individual constituent group. I estimate 
each model separately using average Tone of comment letters across all Big 4 accounting 
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firms, all preparers, all users, etc. In terms of tests of H4 and H5, statistically significant 
1, 1, or 1 when using Big 4 Tone would be consistent with rejecting H4, or in other 
words with Big 4 positions influencing accounting standards. Differences between 1, 1, 
or 1 coefficients based on the constituent group in the estimation suggest differential 
impact on standard setting outcomes based on constituent, and provide evidence for H5.21 
GAAPj measures content change between exposure draft and final standard. It is 
calculated as one minus the document-pair cosine similarity between the two documents, 
and ranges from zero to one. Document-pair cosine similarity is increasingly used in 
accounting, finance, and political science to measure textual differences across documents 
(e.g., Brown and Tucker 2011; Merkley 2014; Haeder and Yackee 2015; Lee 2016). The 
implementation of cosine similarity in this study is outlined in Appendix C. Inferences 
from estimating Model (5) are subject to the caveat that GAAP only measures absolute 
content change, and I am unable to empirically determine the direction of change from 
exposure draft to final standard. However, given that lobbying is generally negative in 
nature as constituents challenge changes to the status quo (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
McKay 2012) and that I observe an overall mean negative Tone in my sample, 
GAAPvarying in response to Big 4 position likely indicates the final standard reverting 
toward pre-existing GAAP. 
                                                 
21 Differences between coefficients on different constituents’ Tone variables imply differential, but not 
necessarily marginal, impact. Untabulated results of estimating Models (5) through (7) that include average 
positions of all constituents result in 1, 1, and 1 coefficients equal to zero for all constituents, likely due to 
correlation in Tone across respective constituent groups. 
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ProjectFailj is an indicator variable equal to one if a final standard is not issued 
based on the exposure draft and the project is removed from the FASB technical agenda, 
and zero otherwise. Issuing a final standard in a timely manner is an indicator of FASB 
success (Beresford and Van Riper 1992), an observation supported by the prominent 
discussion of completed projects in Financial Accounting Foundation annual reports (FAF 
2015; FAF 2016).22 Moreover, the FASB typically does not undertake a project without a 
high likelihood of FASB board consensus and project completion (Miller, Bahnson, and 
Redding 2016).  
LnDaystoFSj is the natural logarithm of the number of days between exposure draft 
and final standard issuance for completed FASB projects. Delays in finalizing a standard 
consume FASB resources and are potentially costly to financial markets in need of 
financial reporting improvements. Thus, timely project completion is likely expected, 
absent constituent opposition. 
The remaining variables in Models (5) through (7) control for factors expected to 
impact the relation between Tone and the three outcomes. The set of control variables is 
similar to that used for estimating Models (1) through (4), except I add LnFSWordsj in 
Models (5) and (7) to control for the relation between final standard length and Tone. Year 
fixed effects are included to control for economic factors that could impact the relationship 
between lobbying positions and FASB reactions. To avoid potential confounding effects 
of multiple exposure drafts associated with a single final standard, I estimate Models (5) 
                                                 
22 This does not necessarily imply a volume-based approach to standard setting, but rather a motivation to 
complete projects once initiated and select projects having a high likelihood of completion. 
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through (7) using only the 71 “first” exposure drafts in a project timeline (see Table 1, 
Panel A). Results are robust to including all 80 exposure drafts. 
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Chapter 5: Data and Empirical Results 
5.1. Data 
5.1.1. Data Sources 
Data used in this study come from FASB exposure drafts, comment letters 
submitted in response to these exposure drafts, Compustat, CRSP, and AuditAnalytics. I 
hand match company names from comment letters downloaded from the FASB website to 
Compustat GVKEY to obtain preparer information from Compustat, CRSP, and 
AuditAnalytics. 
 I download the 301 exposure drafts submitted between 2002 and 2016 from the 
FASB website, and remove title page, summary, background information, and basis for 
conclusions, leaving only the exposure draft body containing proposed amendments. To 
avoid using exposure drafts for which Big 4 incentives are less stark, my tests focus on 80 
exposure drafts I classify as significant. In the pre-Accounting Standards Codification 
(ASC) era (i.e., pre-2009), significant exposure drafts are the 37 associated with SFASs. In 
the ASC era, significant exposure drafts are the 43 not 1) originating with the EITF, 2) 
originating with the Private Company Council (PCC), 3) proposing changes to the 
conceptual framework, or 4) proposing technical corrections.  
 I also download the 17,405 comment letters submitted by FASB constituents in 
response to these 80 significant exposure drafts. I classify comment letters as written by: 
academics, Big 4 firms, smaller auditors, consultants, individuals, law firms, for-profit 
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preparers, not-for-profit preparers, regulators, standard setters, financial statement users, 
and professional organizations.23  
To compute Tone for each comment letter, I eliminate all words not in the Loughran 
and McDonald (2014 – LM) dictionary and then count the number of positive and negative 
words. Positive and negative words are defined using the LM dictionary after contextually 
modifying it by removing standard- and proposal-specific accounting words that are 
germane to the applicable document, but are not used in order to convey support or 
opposition. To eliminate the impact of outliers, I remove 61 comment letters containing 
less than 25 LM words and trim the sample by eliminating the top and bottom percentile 
of comment letters by (positive words / negative words). 16,994 comment letters are used 
in my analyses. 
Table 1, Panel A outlines the final sample of exposure drafts and comment letters 
based on each exposure draft’s relation to completed and “failed” FASB projects. Of the 
80 exposure drafts in my sample, 73 relate to projects that were ultimately finalized. 66 of 
these were the first exposure draft of the project, six were second exposure drafts, and one 
was the third. Seven of the exposure drafts in my sample are associated with five projects 
that failed, with two exposure drafts from failed projects where the FASB issued two 
separate exposure drafts. 
                                                 
23 For purposes of empirical tests using constituent-level data, I aggregate regulators and standard setters 
into a single category, as well as academics, professional organizations, consultants, individuals, law firms, 
and not-for-profit preparers into a single “Other” category. 
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5.1.2. Exposure Draft Characteristics 
Table 1, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for regression model variables. All 
variables are defined in Appendix C. Mean (median) ExDraftTone of -0.255 (-0.300) 
indicates exposure drafts in my sample use more negative words from the LM dictionary 
than positive words, supporting the need to control for ExDraftTone in empirical tests. 
Mean (median) CLCount of 212 (47) shows that while the average exposure draft receives 
over 200 comment letters, the distribution is skewed due to some projects receiving 
hundreds of comment letters.24 Similar skewness is apparent in the length of exposure 
drafts and final standards. ExDraftWords and FSWords have mean (median) of 5,899 
(2,269) and 6,998 (2,641).  
Work is uniformly distributed on [-1,1], with mean and median very close to zero. 
To provide context for construction of Work, Appendix D presents the top and bottom ten 
exposure drafts by value of Work, and the Internet Appendix outlines criteria used to 
identify Compustat firms expected to be affected by each exposure draft used in my 
analyses. Mean (median) GAAPshown in Panel B of Table 1, of 0.436 (0.400) indicates 
the mean (median) final accounting standard changed, in terms of words and word counts, 
from its exposure draft form by 43.6% (40.0%) of total possible change. Mean 
AffectedCAR of 0.032 suggests the average market reaction to exposure draft issuance is 
quite low at 0.032%, which is consistent with prior literature (Khan et al. 2018). Mean 
                                                 
24 For example, “Proposed Accounting Standards Update—Accounting for Financial Instruments and 
Revisions to the Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities—Financial Instruments 
(Topic 825) and Derivatives and Hedging (Topic 815)” received 2,971 comment letters. Many of the 
comment letters were submitted by bank employees representing themselves as users to appear less self-
serving (e.g., Hodder and Hopkins 2014). 
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(median) AgendaExDraftDays of 734 (399) indicates that it typically takes the FASB over 
a year from addition to the technical agenda until exposure draft issuance, with some longer 
projects right-skewing the distribution. Mean ProjectFail of 0.070 reflects that five of the 
71 projects in my sample do not lead to a final standard. Mean (median) DaystoFS of 506 
(296) shows the mean (median) FASB project requires about 17 (10) months to move from 
exposure draft to final standard. 
5.1.3. Comment Letter Characteristics 
Panel C of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 16,994 comment letters by 
constituent group. Mean Tone of -0.238 suggests the average comment letter has a negative 
tone. Mean (median) comment letter length is relatively short at 879 (341) words. Big 4 
accounting firms are more negative than the average commenter with mean (median) Tone 
of -0.287 (-0.330) and write the longest letters with mean (median) CLWords of 2,632 
(1,619) words. User and preparer comment letters have the most positive and second most 
negative positions, with mean (median) Tone of -0.199 (-0.258) and -0.319 (-0.368), 
respectively.  
5.2. Univariate Correlations 
Table 2 presents univariate Pearson (Spearman) correlations. Univariate 
correlations between Big4Tone and Work, ClientTone, and UserTone of 0.131 (0.128), 
0.427 (0.391), and 0.351 (0.449) support rejecting H1 through H3. Big4Tone is 
significantly negatively associated with GAAP, ProjectFail, and LnDaystoFS, supporting 
rejection of H4. Importantly for the supplemental tests discussed in Section 5.3.2, the 
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Pearson (Spearman) correlation between Work and ClientTone is negative at -0.144 
(-0.177). 
5.3. Results from Multivariate Tests of Lobbying Position Determinants 
5.3.1. Tests of H1 through H3 
Tables 3 through 5 present results of estimating Models (1) through (4) to test H1 
through H3, respectively. To address concerns about small- and finite-sample biases, these 
models are estimated using bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the exposure draft 
level after resampling the data 1,000 times (e.g., Cameron and Miller 2015). Table 3, the 
coefficient of 0.110 on Work is statistically significant (p=0.030) and economically 
meaningful—moving across the interquartile range of Work would reflect an increase in 
Big4Tone of 38.3% (33.3%) of mean (median) Big4Tone.25 This suggests Big 4 firms 
support exposure drafts that would, if adopted, increase the amount of required audit and 
consulting work, consistent with rejecting H1. This result is consistent with Watts and 
Zimmerman (1982) and Puro (1984), who show proposals that would increase fees garner 
auditor support, and suggests this effect extends beyond a limited number of accounting 
issues.26 
 Column (1) of Table 4 presents results of estimating Model (2a). The coefficient on 
ClientTone is 0.178 (p=0.048). This coefficient is also economically significant. An 
                                                 
25 [ ( 0.494 – -0.506 ) x 0.110 ] / 0.287 = 0.383 and [ ( 0.494 – -0.506 ) x 0.110 ] / 0.330 = 0.333 
26 For robustness, I recalculate Work after replacing IGParagraphs with ExDraftWords, on the rationale that 
document length is a function of IGParagraphs and longer documents also likely increase demand for 
professional services. Work calculated using IGParagraphs and Work using ExDraftWords are positively 
correlated (=0.503). The coefficient from Model (1) on newly defined Work is positive, but insignificant 
(p=0.183), suggesting document length measures a similar construct as Work, but also that implementation 
guidance is unique. 
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increase in ClientTone across the interquartile range would represent an increase of 19.4% 
(16.8%) of mean (median) Big4Tone, which supports rejecting H2.  As shown in Column 
(2) of Table 4, results are economically and statistically more significant when I replace 
ClientTone with AllBig4ClientTone, or the tone of all audit clients of Big 4 firms. The 
coefficient of 0.371 (p=0.035) implies an interquartile shift would result in an increase in 
Big4Tone of 56.1%. The greater significance when using Tone of all large preparers is 
likely due to greater precision in measuring Tone for all preparers, because I measure the 
latter variable at the exposure draft level and thus have more observations to calculate 
Tone.27  
Results from testing H2 are consistent with auditor-client agreement in Watts and 
Zimmerman (1982) and Puro (1984) as well as agreement between large auditors and big 
business in general, but are inconsistent with results in MacArthur (1988) and McKee et 
al. (1991). As explained in Section 2.2, conflicts in prior research appear to be caused by 
use of non-overlapping small samples. The breadth of my sample and research design 
provide more convincing evidence consistent with rejecting H2. 
 Table 5 presents results of estimating Models (3a) and (3b). As shown in Column 
(1) of Table 5, the coefficient of 0.042 on UserTone is statistically insignificant (p=0.715), 
suggesting financial statement users’ views are not an important determinant of Big 4 
positions. However, it could be the case that user positions expressed in comment letters 
to the FASB are not representative of broader capital market participant views, as user 
                                                 
27 In an untabulated test I find Big4Tone is not statistically associated with average tone of preparers who 
are not clients of Big 4 firms. 
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participation in FASB due process is notoriously low (e.g., Young 2006). For example, 
only 390 comment letters were submitted over the 80 exposure drafts by users or user 
groups, and 22 exposure drafts received no user comment letters at all.28 Such a low rate 
might be expected for concentrated constituent groups like the Big 4 firms, but may not 
effectively capture broad capital market positions. As such, I additionally test H3 by 
estimating Model (3b) using AffectedCAR, measured following Khan et al. (2018), to 
capture the same construct. Khan et al. contend market reactions for firms expected to be 
affected by FASB due process events adequately capture the market’s perception of the 
FASB’s effect on markets. Results, presented in Column (2) of Table 5, mirror those in 
Column (1), with a statistically insignificant coefficient on AffectedCAR of 0.021 
(p=0.527). 29 Based on these results, I am unable to reject H3.  
 Results thus far indicate support for rejecting H1 and H2, but not H3. In other 
words, Big 4 firm positions appear to be associated with work-increasing features of 
exposure drafts and positions of clients, but not with views of financial statement users. 
The economic and statistical magnitudes of the two significant associations are similar, and 
                                                 
28 Prior research suggests financial statement user participation in standard setting is difficult to identify 
(e.g., Allen 2014; Hodder and Hopkins 2014). 
29 For robustness, I additionally obtain insignificant positive results when using the three-day CAR for firms 
that commented on the exposure draft. Use of this variable is based on the rationale that a firm’s submitting 
a comment letter is better evidence that a firm will be impacted by a proposal compared to a methodology 
based on expected impact using Compustat data. As a final robustness test of the User theory, I use change 
in analyst forecast errors for affected firms around final standard adoption to measure the change in the 
usefulness of the information as a result of FASB standard setting. I find similarly insignificant results. 
However, this test final robustness is potentially biased since it can only be estimated in the sample of 
exposure drafts that ultimately led to final standards. 
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suggest each is an important predictor in isolation. However, these results do not provide 
evidence on the incentives’ marginal impacts, suggesting the need for a joint test. 
Column (4) of Table 6 presents results of a combined test of the determinants of 
Big 4 lobbying positions including all three main independent variables of interest. Results 
of the combined test are shown in Column (4), while individual tests of H1 through H3 are 
presented in Columns (1) through (3), respectively. Results show that Work and ClientTone 
are both statistically more significantly associated with Big4Tone when considered jointly 
(p=0.030 and p=0.043, respectively), relative to individual tests. This further supports 
rejecting H1 and H2, and indicates the make-work theory and the client theory of Big 4 
firm lobbying are incrementally important to one another. UserTone remains an 
insignificant determinant of Big 4 lobbying position in joint tests. 
5.3.2. Interaction of Make-work and Client Theories 
Results of the joint test raise questions regarding the interaction, overlap, and 
ordering of these two non-mutually exclusive motivations. For example, Big 4 support for 
exposure drafts that increase demand for professional services could be constrained by 
client opposition. Similarly, the association between Big 4 and client positions could vary 
based on the exposure draft’s work-increasing elements.30 I test these motivations’ 
interaction by estimating Model (1) after splitting the sample at the median of ClientTone 
and estimating Model (2a) after splitting the sample at the median of Work. I also examine 
the mean of Big4Tone in four subsamples defined by these sample medians. 
                                                 
30 Other factors, such as regulatory intervention by the SEC or PCAOB, could also constrain Big 4 positions 
under both theories.  
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Results are presented in Table 7. The coefficient on Work is not significant in the 
subsample of low client support (Column (1) of Panel A), but is positive and statistically 
significant (p=0.069) in the high support subsample. While the difference between 
coefficients is not significant (p=0.528), it suggests Big 4 firms support exposure drafts 
that would increase demand for their services only when clients do not oppose them. 
Results of the second tests in Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A show the coefficient on 
ClientTone is not different across Work-defined subsamples, suggesting Big 4 firm support 
for exposure drafts supported by clients does not differ based on work-increasing 
provisions. Panel B shows Big 4 support is highest in the cell defined by high ClientTone 
and high Work, where the mean Big4Tone of -0.025 is significantly more positive than any 
other cell. The change in Big4Tone is greater when moving from low- to high-ClientTone 
(i.e., left to right) than from low- to high-Work (i.e., top to bottom), although this difference 
is insignificant. Overall, results suggest an interactive effect, which appears to be primarily 
driven by Big 4 firm support for client positions.31 
5.4. Results from Multivariate Tests of Standard Setting Outcomes 
5.4.1. Tests of H4 and H5—Big 4 Lobbying Positions’ Impact on Standard Setting 
Outcomes 
Panels A through D of Table 8 present results from estimating different 
specifications of Models (5) through (7). Similar to the tests of determinants of Big 4 
                                                 
31 This inference is strengthened by the untabulated observation that Big 4 firms comment relatively late in 
the comment period—often on the deadline—suggesting at least the ability, if not the intent, to react to client 
comments. 
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lobbying positions, these models are estimated using bootstrapped standard errors after 
resampling the data 1,000 times. 32 Columns (1) through (7) of each panel present results 
from running the specification within the constituent groups identified in Panel C of Table 
1.  
A statistically significant coefficient of -0.729 on Tone in Column (1) of Panel A 
(p=0.002) indicates greater levels of support among all FASB constituents is associated 
with fewer differences between exposure draft and final standard. This result implies a one 
standard deviation decrease in constituent support is associated with a 0.193 shift in 
GAAP or, since GAAP ranges from 0 to 1, a content change of 19.3%. Turning to 
separate constituencies in Columns (2) through (7), the coefficient on Tone is most 
significant in Column (2) for Big 4 firms. The coefficient of -0.519 (p=0.021) on Tone 
suggests a one standard deviation decrease in Big 4 support is associated with a change in 
content of approximately 16.8%, consistent with rejecting H4. The bottom row of Panel A 
presents p-values for a test of the difference between Tone in each respective column and 
Big 4 Tone in Column (2) to test H5.  While Tone is most negative for Big 4 firms, it is 
statistically more negative than Tone for users (p=0.039), which is moderately consistent 
with rejecting H5. 
 Panel B of Table 8 presents results from estimating Model (6) where the dependent 
variable is ProjectFail. The insignificant coefficient on Tone in Column (1) suggests 
                                                 
32 Because of the low rate of occurrence of FASB projects failing after exposure draft issuance, this 
bootstrapping procedure in Model (6) leads to random draws where the distribution of ProjectFail differs 
drastically from that of the true sample rate of occurrence. The practical result is that bootstrapping in this 
specification leads to standard errors tending toward infinity. To address the low rate of occurrence, I perform 
additional robustness procedures, as discussed below. 
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overall FASB constituent position is not a factor in project abandonment or continuance. 
The coefficient on Tone is significant, however, for two constituent groups—Big 4 firms, 
and regulators and standard setters. The coefficient of -6.454 on Tone in Column (2) 
indicates a one standard deviation decrease in Big 4 support for an exposure draft is 
associated with an increase in log odds of the project failing by a factor of 1.821, supporting 
rejection of H4. Panel B contains support for rejecting H5 as well, with the coefficient on 
Tone for Big 4 comment letters being more negative than the coefficient for smaller 
auditors and other constituents.  
 A potential concern with the Model (6) specification is the low rate of occurrence 
of FASB projects “failing.” Panel A of Table 1 indicates only five of the 71 first exposure 
drafts in this sample fail, consistent with the observation in Miller et al. (2016) that “only 
a few projects have been completely dropped from the agenda.” Logistic regression can 
underestimate the probability of rare events occurring and can produce biased coefficients. 
Several bias correction methods have been proposed (e.g., King and Zeng 2001). Firth’s 
(1993) penalized maximum likelihood method is a general solution that is well suited to 
small samples. Results of estimating Model (6) using Firth’s penalized MLE procedure, 
presented in Panel C of Table 8, are consistent with those in Panel B. 
 The dependent variable ProjectFail is inherently related to survival of FASB 
projects. Thus, another question related to estimating the propensity of FASB projects 
“failing” is whether logistic or survival models most appropriately capture the factors 
contributing to abandonment of standard setting initiatives. To address this question, I 
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additionally estimate a Cox proportional hazard model in the sample of FASB projects.33 
In a model including all Model (6) explanatory variables, the coefficient (hazard ratio) on 
Tone for Big 4 firms is -5.895 (0.0028) and statistically significant at p=0.002, providing 
strong corroborating evidence that Big 4 lobbying is associated with standard setting 
outcomes.34,35  
However, because estimating survival models requires observing or reliably 
estimating the timing of exit from the sample, results of survival analyses should be 
interpreted with some caution. Discussions with FASB staff suggest that projects can be 
dormant for long periods of time (i.e., effectively removed from FASB agenda) before 
being formally removed from the FASB Board’s technical agenda, and that the agenda 
removal decision can be determined as much by the extant FASB chairman’s penchant for 
tidiness and order as by more substantive factors. This appears to be the case in my 
sample—although failed projects’ exposure draft dates range from 2003 to 2014, their 
agenda removal decisions were from 2012 through 2015, and all but one were removed by 
the same chairman after 2013. Nevertheless, when combined with results from a logistic 
model and Firth’s (1993) penalized MLE model, this evidence persuasively suggests a 
strong relation between FASB standard setting outcomes and Big 4 lobbying positions. 
                                                 
33 The Cox partial likelihood estimator is suitable in this context because it does not require estimates of a 
baseline hazard function, which I assume to be constant across all projects the FASB adds to its agenda. 
34 I use the exposure draft issuance as the origin date. Results of Cox partial likelihood models are slightly 
weaker, but still statistically significant when the date at which the project was added to the FASB agenda 
is used as the origin. 
35 Similar to the other specifications of Model (6), the only other constituent group for which Tone is 
significant is regulators and standard setters, with a coefficient (hazard ratio) of -2.416 (0.089) and 
p=0.046. 
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 Panel D of Table 8 presents results of estimating Model (7). The coefficient on 
Tone is significantly negative for all constituent groups except users in Column (5) and 
other constituents in Column (7). The coefficient on Tone for Big 4 firms of -1.299 
indicates that a one standard deviation decrease in Big 4 support is associated with a 
11.71% 36 longer delay in the FASB issuing a final standard, consistent with rejecting H4. 
However, and in contrast to the other Panels of Table 8, the coefficient on Tone is not most 
significant for Big 4 firms in this Panel, but rather for preparers, which is inconsistent with 
rejecting H5. However, the coefficient on Tone for Big 4 firms is significantly greater than 
the coefficient on Tone for users in Column (5), which is moderately consistent with H5 
with regard to the impact of users in FASB due process. 
Evidence in Table 8 is consistent with rejecting H4, and is generally supportive of 
rejecting H5. In other words, results consistently show that Big 4 positions are significantly 
associated with standard setting outcomes.37 However, while Big 4 Tone is the most 
significant in three of the four panels in Table 5, its statistical significance, relative to that 
of the FASB’s other constituent groups, depends on model specification and comparison 
group. A notable finding from tests of H4 and H5 is that user positions are not significantly 
associated with any standard setting outcomes I examine. This is potentially surprising, 
given the FASB’s mission to provide decision-useful information. As noted in Section 
                                                 
36 [ (e-1.145 – 1) x 0.322 ] / 2, where 0.322 is the standard deviation of Big 4 Tone and I divide by 2 because 
the variable is measured on [-1,1].  
37 To examine whether one particular Big 4 firm dominates in this regard, I re-perform tests of H4 and H5 
at the individual Big 4 firm level. The coefficient on Tone of comment letters from Deloitte is greater 
economically and statistically than the coefficient on Tone of comment letters from other auditors in three of 
the four models estimated (untabulated). However, these differences are not statistically significant at 
conventional levels. As such, results are inconclusive as to whether one firm dominates in FASB due process. 
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5.3.5, user participation in standard setting has historically been low. Thus, it is possible 
that only privately communicated user feedback is incorporated in accounting standards. It 
is also possible that collective action problems, whereby disparate user incentives lead 
them to avoid incurring private costs to promote public goods (e.g., Olson 1965), reduce 
user participation. However, given that observed user comment letter lobbying is 
unassociated with outcomes, this finding is more consistent with disenfranchisement, 
whereby user participation in standard setting is low because their views are not reflected 
in standard setting outcomes. 
5.5. Supplemental Analyses 
5.5.1. Association between Changes to Implementation Guidance and Audit Fees 
Results of primary analyses suggest Big 4 positions are associated with work-
increasing elements of exposure drafts, where this construct is measured using Work, 
defined as IGParagraphs weighted by Ubiquity. To provide evidence on construct 
validity, I examine the impact on audit fees of adopting high-Work accounting standards 
by treating accounting standard adoptions as separate events and performing a stacked 
cohort difference-in-differences analysis (e.g., Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004; 
Gormley and Matsa 2011).  
I perform the difference-in-differences analysis using final standards that were 
adopted prior to 2014 to ensure I have audit fees for complying firms for two years before 
and after adoption. Of the 66 final standards in my sample, I eliminate nine for which I 
am unable to establish robust criteria to determine affected firms (see Appendix D), and 
an additional nine that were not adopted by 2014, leaving 38 final standards. I then split 
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this sample at the median of IGParagraphs—my definition of a high-Work standard. I 
estimate the effect of adopting high-Work standards on audit fees by estimating Model 
(8): 
LnAuditFeesist = 0 1Treatedis + 2 Postst + 3TreatedisXPostst   
+ 4LnAssetsist + 5LnSegmentsist + 6ROA-1ist + 7Ageist  
+ 8SalesGrowthist + 9Foreignist + 10CalendarYEist   
+ 11Opinionist + 12Mergerist + Year-FS FE  
+ Firm-FS FE ist     (8) 
 
where i, s, and t index firm, accounting standard, and adoption period, respectively. 
Treated is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is affected by a high-Work standard, 
and zero otherwise. Post is an indicator equal to one if the observation is after adoption of 
accounting standard s, and zero otherwise. The interaction of Treated and Post is the 
independent variable of interest, where positive 3 indicates higher audit fees after 
adopting accounting standard s. Other variables, defined in Appendix C, are included to 
control for audit fee determinants as in Hogan and Wilkins (2008). Control variables are 
also interacted with Post, but are not presented for brevity. 
There are 13,856 Treated firms in the sample. I perform the analysis in three 
samples with three different control groups: 1) firms that are unaffected by standard s in 
the same adoption period t as treated firms (N = 113,033), 2) firms adopting low-Work 
standards in their own respective adoption periods (N = 17,614), and 3) the combination 
of 1) and 2) (N = 130,647). Following the approach in Bertrand et al. (2004), I collapse 
time-series variation in audit fees and control variables by taking the average of these 
variables for the two years before and after adopting standard s such that the units of 
 51 
analysis are a single “pre” and “post” observation for each firm-standard observation, or 
2 x N as outlined above. 
Similar to other stacked cohort difference-in-difference analyses (see Gormley 
and Matsa 2011 for a similar design), my formation of treatment and control groups 
results in Treated firms for one accounting standard serving as controls for other 
standards in the same regression. I include year-standard and firm-standard fixed effects 
to control for firm- and time-invariant factors, specific to each standard, that could impact 
the relationship between adoption and fees. I also cluster standard errors by both firm and 
industry (using Fama and French 49 industries) to account for potential firm- and 
industry-specific covariance. 
Results of the analysis are presented in Panel A of Table 9. Columns (1) through 
(3) present results from using the first control group, Columns (4) and (5) the results of 
the smaller control group, and Columns (6) through (9) for the combined control group. I 
find significantly positive 3 in each specification, suggesting Work captures changes in 
accounting standards that cause a meaningful increase in audit fees.  
To provide economic intuition for the audit fee increase, I tabulate a simple two-
by-two matrix of average audit fees for treatment and control firms for two years before 
and after adoption in Panel B of Table 9, using the estimated coefficients from Columns 
(1), (4), or (7), depending on the sample. As indicated in Column (3), audit fees increase 
more for treated firms relative to the first control group by $127,136, or 121.6%. Column 
(6) shows that although control firms had a higher audit fees in the pre- and post-adoption 
periods, treated firm audit fees increased by $39,110 (20.3%) on a relative basis. Columns 
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(7) through (9) reflect a weighted average of results in the first and second set of columns, 
and hence lead to similar inferences. 
5.5.2. Litigation Risk as an Alternative Explanation for Make-work Results 
Results of primary analyses suggest Big 4 lobbying positions are associated with 
features of exposure drafts that would increase demand for professional services. However, 
due to the overlap of such exposure draft features and those of rules-based standards that 
shield firms and auditors from litigation risk (e.g., Schipper 2003; Donelson et al. 2012; 
Kadous and Mercer 2012), lobbying to reduce risk is a potential alternative explanation.  
I perform a supplemental test examining whether exposure to higher levels of ex 
ante litigation risk leads Big 4 firms to respond differently to higher levels of Work in an 
exposure draft. The rationale for this test is that if higher values of Work capture higher 
levels of rules that shield auditors from litigation risk (as opposed to higher levels of audit 
and consulting work), then Big 4 firms facing higher levels of ex ante litigation risk should 
respond more favorably to high-Work exposure drafts. I measure the average ex ante 
litigation risk following Kim and Skinner (2012) for all firms that would be affected by 
each exposure draft in my sample. I then collapse this measure to the Big 4 comment letter 
level by computing average ex ante litigation risk across audit clients of each Big 4 firm as 
of the fiscal year preceding exposure draft issuance. After dividing the sample of Big 4 
comment letters at the median of this measure, I re-estimate Model (1). I find Work is a 
stronger predictor of Big 4 support in the low-risk subsample (untabulated), which is the 
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opposite of what would be expected under risk reduction. The difference in coefficients 
across subsamples is not significant, however.38 
5.5.3. Coordination Analyses 
Prior research provides several reasons Big 4 firms may lobby as a group. Group- 
or coalition-based lobbying is effective in regulatory contexts when there is clear consensus 
among group members (Nelson and Yackee 2012) and where resource sharing is beneficial 
(Hula 1999; Nownes 2006). Big 4 firms likely also have strategic incentives to present 
united, rather than discordant, views (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Lobbying in a coordinated 
manner, independent of private incentives, is consistent with Amershi, Demski, and 
Wolfson’s (1982) model of accounting standard setting as a long-term strategic game, 
where each voting agent may unanimously vote for a second-best view. Coordinated Big 
4 firm lobbying is most likely to occur in concert with make-work incentives since client-
specific interests preclude consensus. 
To test whether work-increasing exposure draft provisions increase unity among 
Big 4 positions, I re-estimate Model (1) at the exposure draft level after replacing the 
dependent variable Big4Tone with the standard deviation of tone across Big 4 firms for an 
exposure draft. I find a weakly negative coefficient on Work (p=0.150, untabulated), which 
                                                 
38 This inference differs from the conclusions of Allen et al. (2018), who find Big N auditor mentions of 
reliability are associated with over-time changes in prevailing litigation risk. The difference is likely due to 
significant research design differences—whereas tests by Allen et al. are designed to detect time-series 
variation in auditor lobbying for reliability based on own litigation risk, my tests are designed to detect 
differences in lobbying for work-increasing provisions in the cross-section of exposure drafts based on client 
risk.  
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is mildly supportive of greater levels of work leading to more coordination among Big 4 
firms. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
Motivated by the considerable participation of Big 4 firms in FASB due process, 
this study seeks to develop a more complete understanding of the determinants and 
consequences of their lobbying positions. I acknowledge several limitations. First, in the 
absence of formal voting or roll call procedures for FASB constituents, I rely on textual 
features of comment letters to proxy for lobbying positions. Despite the efficiency-related 
advantages of this approach and my extensive construct validity tests (see Appendix B), I 
cannot rule out the possibility that this method under- or over-weights certain comment 
letter characteristics or fails to fully capture lobbying positions.  
In addition, this study’s reliance on the comment letter phase of FASB due process 
is based on the rationale that comment letter positions are correlated with the positions 
FASB constituents promote privately. Inferences are limited if public comment letter 
positions are orthogonal to privately advocated lobbying views. However, under the mild 
assumption of correlation between public and private lobbying, it is more likely that this 
inability to observe Big 4 firms’ “quiet” lobbying efforts leads to my underestimating the 
impact of Big 4 firms in the standard setting process.  
Finally, if FASB constituents choose to abstain from the comment letter process 
altogether, their lobbying positions are not captured in my tests. This limitation does not 
apply to analyses of Big 4 comment letters, as Big 4 firms commented on virtually every 
proposal analyzed, but tests using other constituents’ comment letter positions may lack 
power as a result. 
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Notwithstanding these caveats, this study contributes to an understanding of the 
political economy of accounting standard development. The evidence indicates that Big 4 
lobbying positions are associated with the amount of additional audit and consulting work 
that is likely to result from adopting proposed standards and with positions of clients, and 
that Big 4 support for work-increasing proposals is constrained by client opposition. These 
findings have implications for accounting standard setting because, as I show in 
consequences tests, Big 4 positions are significantly associated with the amount, timing, 
and predicted failure of changes from exposure draft to final standard. Given the paucity 
of research on systematic incentives shaping constituent lobbying positions before the 
FASB (e.g., Gipper et al. 2013), my study provides novel insights into accounting standard 
development and are informative to standard setters as they evaluate Big 4 lobbying 
positions. 
Results additionally suggest that lobbying positions of financial statement users are 
decidedly unrelated to both Big 4 lobbying positions and standard setting outcomes, which 
is potentially surprising given the FASB’s mission of serving users. However, this evidence 
is consistent with and may provide an explanation for prior research documenting low user 
participation in FASB agenda setting (Allen 2014), comment letter submission (Tandy and 
Wilburn 1992; Weetman et al. 1996; Hodder and Hopkins 2014), and overall FASB due 
process (Young 2006). Specifically, my results suggest users may not participate because 
their positions are disregarded. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Exposure drafts and comment letters 
 
Exposure 
drafts 
Comment 
letters 
First exposure draft of a FASB project resulting in a final standard 66 14,363 
Second exposure draft of a project leading to a final standard 6 1,542 
Third exposure draft of a project leading to a final standard 1 167 
Sample for completed projects 73 16,072 
   
First exposure draft of a failed FASB project 5 549 
Second exposure draft of a failed FASB project 2 373 
Final sample for all projects 80 16,994 
Panel B: Model variables 
 N Mean Std. Dev 25% 50% 75% 
ExDraftTonej 80 -0.255 0.424 -0.596 -0.300 0.060 
CLCountj 80 212 750 28 47 102 
ExDraftWordsj 80 5,899 10,466 1,069 2,269 5,168 
FSWordsj 66 6,998 10,431 1,401 2,641 6,749 
Workj 80 -0.013 0.059 -0.506 -0.013 0.494 
ClientToneij 316 -0.137 0.264 -0.313 -0.048 0.000 
AllBig4ClientTonej 80 -0.136 0.227 -0.274 -0.063 0.016 
UserTonej 80 -0.156 0.291 -0.335 -0.109 0.000 
AffectedCARj 68 0.032 0.734 -0.207 0.061 0.352 
AgendaExDraftDaysj 80 734 789 161 399 1,184 
GAAPj 66 0.436 0.294 0.200 0.400 0.700 
ProjectFailj 71 0.070 0.258 0.000 0.000 0.000 
DaystoFSj 66 506 591 176 296 514 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, continued 
 
Panel C: Comment letter characteristics 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev 25% 50% 75% 
All constituents 
Tone 16,994 -0.238 0.446 -0.569 -0.313 0.000 
CLWords 16,994 879 1,399 184 341 993 
Big 4 
Tone 316 -0.287 0.323 -0.519 -0.330 -0.096 
CLWords 316 2,632 2,692 855 1,619 3,355 
Other auditors 
Tone 506 -0.365 0.306 -0.596 -0.429 -0.179 
CLWords 506 1,439 1,444 435 957 1,913 
Preparers  
Tone 5,228 -0.319 0.353 -0.585 -0.368 -0.100 
CLWords 5,228 1,151 1,387 319 640 1,488 
Users 
Tone 390 -0.199 0.380 -0.462 -0.258 0.000 
CLWords 390 1,678 2,304 465 1,091 1,988 
Regulators and 
standard setters 
Tone 272 -0.317 0.309 -0.550 -0.333 -0.148 
CLWords 272 2,163 1,837 902 1,625 2,874 
Other 
Tone 10,282 -0.188 0.492 -0.561 -0.250 0.143 
CLWords 10,282 595 1,161 148 233 451 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of variables used in the analyses in this paper. All variables 
are defined in Appendix C. Panel A outlines the final sample of exposure drafts and comment 
letters based on each exposure draft’s relation to completed and failed FASB projects, Panel B 
presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in my regression models, and Panel C 
presents comment letter-specific variables for comment letters received from all constituents on 
significant FASB projects. 
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Table 2: Univariate Correlations 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Big4Toneij (1)  0.603 -0.271 -0.095 -0.157 0.128 0.391 0.503 0.449 0.161 -0.171 -0.328 -0.231 -0.125 
ExDraftTonej (2) 0.606  -0.044 0.273 -0.129 0.244 0.418 0.528 0.493 0.144 -0.105 -0.100 -0.098 0.199 
LnCLCountj (3) -0.256 -0.137  0.482 0.682 0.606 -0.433 -0.470 -0.223 -0.021 0.330 0.312 0.081 0.515 
LnExDraftWordsj (4) -0.114 0.260 0.002  0.603 0.528 -0.205 -0.205 -0.071 0.132 0.430 0.058 -0.070 0.697 
LnFSWordsj (5) -0.157 0.015 0.701 0.774  0.499 -0.189 -0.197 -0.297 0.043 0.405 0.025 - 0.641 
Workj (6) 0.131 0.255 0.536 0.479 0.495  -0.177 -0.115 -0.186 0.192 0.270 -0.048 0.094 0.264 
ClientToneij (7) 0.427 0.465 -0.394 -0.123 -0.166 -0.144  0.829 0.096 0.059 -0.214 -0.278 -0.178 0.016 
AllBig4ClientTonej (8) 0.509 0.543 -0.456 -0.144 -0.197 -0.168 0.857  0.552 0.073 -0.294 -0.268 -0.284 -0.343 
UserTonej (9) 0.351 0.493 -0.223 -0.071 -0.297 -0.148 0.096 0.556  -0.027 -0.236 0.116 -0.111 -0.220 
AffectedCAR (10) 0.125 0.076 -0.063 0.107 0.006 0.067 -0.016 -0.018 -0.142  0.122 -0.344 -0.035 -0.107 
LnAgendaExDraftDaysj (11) -0.163 -0.113 0.319 0.411 0.392 0.265 -0.243 -0.284 -0.273 0.163  0.100 0.081 0.285 
GAAPj (12) -0.297 -0.100 0.312 0.058 0.025 -0.078 -0.278 -0.251 0.116 -0.356 0.080  - 0.131 
ProjectFailj (13) -0.224 -0.089 0.055 -0.075 - 0.071 -0.126 -0.187 -0.097 -0.034 0.084 -  - 
LnDaystoFSj (14) -0.211 0.199 0.515 0.697 0.641 0.262 0.016 -0.306 -0.220 -0.394 0.445 0.131 -  
Table 2 presents univariate Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients below (above) the diagonal for variables used in the main analyses. Bold 
values represent statistical significance at <0.10.  
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Table 3: Make-work Theory 
 
Model: (1) 
Dependent Variable: Big4Tone 
    
Work 0.110** 
 (2.050) 
ExDraftTone 0.384*** 
 (4.429) 
LnCLWords -0.0911*** 
 (-2.974) 
LnCLCount -0.0238 
 (-0.848) 
LnExDraftWords 0.0228 
 (0.777) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays -0.00635 
 (-0.235) 
Constant 0.0885 
 (0.316) 
  
Observations 316 
R-squared 0.501 
Auditor FE Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Table 3 presents results for estimating Model (1) to test 
H1, where all variables are defined in Appendix C. ***, 
**, and * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, 
p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. Z-statistics based on 
bootstrapped standard errors after resampling the data 
1,000 times, clustered at the exposure draft level, are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 4: Client Theory 
 
Column: (1) (2) 
Model: (2a) (2b) 
Dependent Variable: Big4Tone Big4Tone 
     
ClientTone 0.178**  
 (1.983)  
AllBig4ClientTone  0.371** 
  (2.106) 
ExDraftTone 0.371*** 0.316*** 
 (4.087) (3.079) 
LnCLWords -0.0751** -0.0678** 
 (-2.434) (-2.148) 
LnCLCount 0.00547 0.0207 
 (0.189) (0.696) 
LnExDraftWords 0.0284 0.0224 
 (0.908) (0.725) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays -0.00557 -0.00592 
 (-0.197) (-0.207) 
Constant -0.203 -0.263 
 (-0.752) (-1.051) 
   
Observations 316 316 
R-squared 0.494 0.508 
Auditor FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Table 4 presents results from estimating Models (2a) and (2b) to test H2, 
where all variables are defined in Appendix C. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. Z-
statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors after resampling the data 
1,000 times, clustered at the exposure draft level, are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 5: User Theory 
 
Column: (1) (2) 
Model: (3a) (3b) 
Dependent Variable: Big4Tone Big4Tone 
      
UserTone 0.042  
 (0.341)  
AffectedCAR  0.021 
  (0.633) 
ExDraftTone 0.408*** 0.420*** 
 (4.206) (4.951) 
LnCLWords -0.0815** -0.0814** 
 (-2.527) (-2.515) 
LnCLCount -0.007 -0.004 
 (-0.222) (-0.131) 
LnExDraftWords 0.0335 0.0296 
 (1.009) (0.923) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays -0.004 -0.007 
 (-0.117) (-0.244) 
Constant -0.211 -0.148 
 (-0.748) (-0.504) 
   
Observations 316 316 
R-squared 0.483 0.485 
Auditor FE Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Table 5 presents results from estimating Models (3a) and (3b) to test H3, 
where all variables are defined in Appendix C. ***, **, and * represent 
statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. Z-
statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors after resampling the data 
1,000 times, clustered at the exposure draft level, are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 6: Multivariate Tests of Big 4 Lobbying Position Determinants 
 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Model: (1a) (2a) (3a) (4) 
Dependent variable = Big4Tone Big4Tone Big4Tone Big4Tone 
       
Work 0.110**   0.117*** 
 (2.050)   (2.164) 
ClientTone  0.178**  0.174** 
  (1.983)  (1.990) 
UserTone   0.042 0.043 
   (0.341) (0.353) 
ExDraftTone 0.384*** 0.371*** 0.408*** 0.319*** 
 (4.429) (4.087) (4.206) (3.064) 
LnCLWords -0.0911*** -0.0751** -0.0815** -0.0828*** 
 (-2.974) (-2.434) (-2.527) (-2.811) 
LnCLCount -0.0238 0.00547 -0.007 -0.00988 
 (-0.848) (0.189) (-0.222) (-0.341) 
LnExDraftWords 0.0228 0.0284 0.0335 0.0159 
 (0.777) (0.908) (1.009) (0.524) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays -0.00635 -0.00557 -0.004 -0.00534 
 (-0.235) (-0.197) (-0.117) (-0.192) 
Constant 0.0885 -0.203 -0.211 0.00818 
 (0.316) (-0.752) (-0.748) (0.0317) 
     
Observations 316 316 316 316 
R-squared 0.501 0.494 0.483 0.514 
Auditor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6 presents the combined results of estimating Models (1) through (4). Columns (1) through 
(3) present results from testing H1 through H3. Column (4) presents results of estimating Model 
(4) where all determinant variables of interest are included. ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. Z-statistics based on bootstrapped 
standard errors after resampling the data 1,000 times, clustered at the exposure draft level, are 
presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
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Table 7: Joint Tests of Make-work and Client Theories 
 
Panel A: Models (1) and (2a) in subsamples 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Partition: Low ClientTone High ClientTone Low Work High Work 
Dependent variable: Big4Tone Big4Tone Big4Tone Big4Tone 
      
Work 0.0643 0.167*   
 (0.696) (1.817)   
ClientTone   0.153 0.172 
   (1.113) (1.281) 
ExDraftTone 0.460*** 0.295** 0.272 0.391*** 
 (4.606) (2.084) (1.373) (3.351) 
LnCLCount -0.0282 0.0185 -0.00224 -0.0181 
 (-0.693) (0.260) (-0.0332) (-0.589) 
LnExDraftWords 0.00457 0.0362 0.0356 0.00351 
 (0.124) (0.689) (0.430) (0.0884) 
LnCLWords 0.000809 -0.144*** -0.138*** -0.0266 
 (0.0263) (-3.137) (-2.829) (-0.727) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays -0.0250 0.00844 0.00496 -0.0155 
 (-0.695) (0.188) (0.0977) (-0.368) 
Constant -0.0286 0.192 0.236 0.0558 
 (-0.0921) (0.462) (0.381) (0.202)      
 
    
Observations 158 158 158 158 
R-squared 0.553 0.518 0.470 0.679 
Auditor FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Two-by-two of mean Big4Tone 
 (1) (2) (3)  
 Low ClientTone High ClientTone Big4Tone diff   
Low Work -0.372 -0.308 0.064  
High Work -0.360 -0.025*** 0.335  
Big4Tone diff 0.012 0.283 0.271  
Table 7 presents results from interactive tests of H1 and H2. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A present 
results from estimating Model (1) separately in subsamples where ClientTone is below and above the 
sample median, respectively. Columns (3) and (4) of Panel A present results from estimating Model 
(2a) separately in subsamples where Work is below and above the sample median, respectively. Panel 
B presents a simple two-by-two comparison of mean Big4Tone in four cells based on the sample 
medians of ClientTone and Work. In Panel A, ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 
p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively, with z-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors after 
resampling the data 1,000 times, clustered at the exposure draft level, are presented in parentheses 
below the coefficient estimates. In Panel B, *** indicates statistical significance at p<0.01 compared to 
each of the remaining three cells. 
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Table 8: Association between Comment Letter Tone and Standard Setting Outcomes 
 
Panel A: Average constituent tone and changes from exposure draft to final standard 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: GAAPΔ GAAPΔ GAAPΔ GAAPΔ GAAPΔ GAAPΔ GAAPΔ 
Constituency = All Big 4 
Other 
auditors 
Preparers Users 
Regulators 
and Std. 
Setters 
Other 
               
Tone -0.729*** -0.519** -0.397* -0.434** 0.257 -0.194 -0.167 
 (-3.026) (-2.315) (-1.791) (-2.118) (0.770) (-0.790) (-0.794) 
ExDraftTone 0.260* 0.198 0.143 0.143 -0.0656 0.0151 0.0465 
 (1.955) (1.368) (1.013) (0.964) (-0.468) (0.120) (0.297) 
LnCLCount 0.0538 0.0571 0.0424 0.0411 0.0741 0.0570 0.0629 
 (0.997) (1.031) (0.680) (0.705) (1.170) (1.257) (1.133) 
LnExDraftWords 0.0621 0.0589 0.0303 0.0455 0.0554 0.0733 0.0653 
 (0.647) (0.572) (0.292) (0.465) (0.499) (0.769) (0.583) 
LnFSWords -0.0709 -0.0726 -0.0517 -0.0483 -0.0404 -0.0723 -0.0573 
 (-0.816) (-0.768) (-0.544) (-0.537) (-0.405) (-0.825) (-0.580) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays -0.0235 -0.0205 -0.0191 -0.00998 -0.0130 -0.0169 -0.0316 
 (-0.438) (-0.362) (-0.321) (-0.165) (-0.216) (-0.303) (-0.519) 
Constant 0.356 0.363 0.501 0.333 0.116 0.310 0.293 
 (1.105) (1.051) (1.353) (0.930) (0.249) (0.863) (0.790) 
        
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R-squared 0.322 0.261 0.240 0.243 0.185 0.184 0.186 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value for difference 
between Tone and 
Column (2) Tone 
  0.349 0.549 0.039** 0.862 0.467 
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Table 8: Association between Comment Letter Tone and Standard Setting Outcomes, continued 
 
Panel B: Average constituent tone and project continuation 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail 
Constituent group = All Big 4 
Other 
auditors 
Preparers Users 
Regulators 
and Std. 
Setters 
Other 
               
Tone -2.315 -6.454*** -0.634 -1.491 -3.564 -2.710* 1.161 
 (-1.193) (-2.775) (-0.444) (-0.813) (-1.078) (-1.852) (0.696) 
ExDraftTone 0.0725 1.650* -0.535 -0.265 -0.0974 -0.459 -1.199 
 (0.0767) (1.758) (-0.503) (-0.196) (-0.0879) (-0.463) (-1.048) 
LnCLCount 0.343 0.499* 0.310 0.272 0.226 0.132 0.350 
 (1.194) (1.778) (1.078) (1.052) (0.689) (0.411) (1.237) 
LnExDraftWords -0.657 -1.024 -0.631 -0.552 -0.699 -0.581 -0.592 
 (-1.046) (-1.344) (-1.210) (-1.009) (-1.059) (-1.015) (-1.040) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays 0.278 0.509 0.289 0.293 0.209 0.287 0.351 
 (0.747) (1.033) (0.837) (0.805) (0.556) (0.728) (0.871) 
Constant -1.264 -1.980 -1.111 -1.675 -0.0310 -0.956 -1.677 
 (-0.435) (-0.546) (-0.422) (-0.623) (-0.0077) (-0.323) (-0.501) 
        
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0768 0.197 0.0583 0.0711 0.113 0.0977 0.0690 
Year FE No No No No No No No 
p-value for difference 
between Tone and 
Column (2) Tone 
  0.016** 0.644 0.708 0.407 0.041** 
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Table 8: Association between Comment Letter Tone and Standard Setting Outcomes, continued 
 
Panel C: Penalized maximum likelihood estimation (Firth 1993) 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail ProjectFail 
Constituent group = All Big 4 
Other 
auditors 
Preparers Users 
Regulators 
and Std. 
Setters 
Other 
               
Tone -1.790 -4.843* -0.344 -1.090 -2.607 -2.070 0.835 
 (-0.746) (-1.760) (-0.175) (-0.611) (-1.177) (-1.077) (0.550) 
ExDraftTone 0.0716 1.274 -0.418 -0.248 -0.0652 -0.303 -0.828 
 (0.0526) (0.893) (-0.325) (-0.203) (-0.0563) (-0.284) (-0.676) 
LnCLCount 0.312 0.406 0.284 0.246 0.264 0.189 0.313 
 (0.918) (1.114) (0.854) (0.716) (0.672) (0.503) (1.008) 
LnExDraftWords -0.533 -0.779 -0.508 -0.465 -0.562 -0.480 -0.508 
 (-0.991) (-1.188) (-0.967) (-0.897) (-1.032) (-0.914) (-1.003) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays 0.217 0.363 0.239 0.235 0.165 0.224 0.298 
 (0.506) (0.750) (0.575) (0.545) (0.370) (0.513) (0.702) 
Constant -1.123 -1.515 -1.076 -1.330 -0.326 -0.985 -1.378 
 (-0.339) (-0.445) (-0.300) (-0.390) (-0.0896) (-0.285) (-0.394) 
        
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
Pseudo R-squared 0.861 0.579 0.903 0.870 0.725 0.754 0.844 
Year FE No No No No No No No 
p-value for difference 
between Tone and 
Column (2) Tone 
  0.092* 0.611 0.703 0.427 0.118 
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Table 8: Association between Comment Letter Tone and Standard Setting Outcomes, continued 
Panel D: Average constituent tone and time from Exposure Draft to Final Standard 
Column: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Dependent variable: 
LnDays 
toFS 
LnDays 
toFS 
LnDays 
toFS 
LnDays 
toFS 
LnDays 
toFS 
LnDays 
toFS 
LnDays 
toFS 
Constituent group = All Big 4 
Other 
auditors 
Preparers Users Regulators Other 
               
Tone -1.648** -1.299* -1.031* -1.585** -0.252 -1.060 -0.722 
 (-2.439) (-1.909) (-1.780) (-2.467) (-0.334) (-1.477) (-1.404) 
ExDraftTone 0.403 0.315 0.194 0.365 -0.188 -0.0353 0.0592 
 (0.944) (0.695) (0.451) (0.902) (-0.468) (-0.0938) (0.137) 
LnCLCount -0.0858 -0.0808 -0.120 -0.151 -0.0624 -0.111 -0.0742 
 (-0.471) (-0.428) (-0.594) (-0.788) (-0.305) (-0.556) (-0.393) 
LnExDraftWords -0.129 -0.134 -0.207 -0.169 -0.172 -0.0195 -0.0842 
 (-0.379) (-0.383) (-0.608) (-0.496) (-0.469) (-0.0548) (-0.234) 
LnFSWords 0.458 0.448 0.499 0.505 0.510 0.369 0.464 
 (1.408) (1.316) (1.513) (1.530) (1.457) (1.077) (1.353) 
LnAgendaExDraftDays 0.120 0.126 0.130 0.164 0.122 0.143 0.0766 
 (0.851) (0.887) (0.900) (1.162) (0.785) (0.967) (0.492) 
Constant 3.168*** 3.202*** 3.568*** 3.188*** 3.157** 3.159*** 3.052*** 
 (2.696) (2.714) (2.772) (2.859) (2.075) (2.600) (2.608) 
        
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R-squared 0.611 0.597 0.590 0.626 0.556 0.589 0.579 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
p-value for difference 
between Tone and 
Column (2) Tone 
  0.382 0.739 0.089* 0.781 0.351 
Table 8 presents results from estimating Models (5) through (7), where all variables are defined in Appendix C. Column (1) 
presents results when using average Tone across all constituents, and Columns (2) through (7) present results when using 
average Tone across the indicated constituent group. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and 
p<0.10, respectively. Z-statistics based on bootstrapped standard errors after resampling the data 1,000 times are presented in 
parentheses below the coefficient estimates. P-values for coefficient differences are given by  
Z = (1 – 2) / √(SE12 + SE22). 
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Table 9: Change in Audit Fees after Adopting High-Work Standards 
Panel A: Stacked cohort difference-in-differences test 
 Column: (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
Sample 1: Control group is unaffected 
firms in same period as Treated firms 
Sample 2: Control firms are those affected 
by low-Work standards in adoption period 
Sample 3: Control group consists of 
control firms from Samples 1 and 2 
Treated -0.254*** -0.061*** -0.010 -0.170***  -0.254*** -0.061*** -0.010 
 (-11.720) (-4.919) (-1.077) (-10.609)  (-11.892) (-4.884) (-1.072) 
Post 0.095*** 0.097*** 0.182*** 0.118*** 0.137*** 0.095*** 0.098*** 0.176*** 
 (16.237) (22.364) (4.020) (7.853) (12.191) (17.614) (21.883) (3.915) 
Treated X Post 0.117*** 0.124*** 0.027*** 0.072*** 0.093*** 0.118*** 0.123*** 0.027*** 
 (5.421) (7.254) (3.003) (4.888) (6.262) (5.675) (7.238) (2.988) 
LnAssets 0.404*** 0.350*** 0.330*** 0.432*** 0.380*** 0.405*** 0.354*** 0.333*** 
 (18.798) (16.683) (20.720) (29.158) (13.524) (20.816) (16.599) (20.479) 
LnSegments 0.327*** 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.415*** 0.045*** 0.332*** 0.039*** 0.028*** 
 (2.778) (3.910) (3.150) (3.864) (3.150) (2.855) (3.866) (3.180) 
ROA -0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.000 
 (-0.210) (0.084) (-0.079) (-0.325) (0.120) (-0.224) (0.153) (-0.018) 
FirmAge 0.003*** 0.004* -0.000 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.004* -0.000 
 (3.047) (1.951) (-0.045) (5.821) (0.471) (3.153) (1.799) (-0.049) 
SalesGrowth 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000* 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (1.037) (4.459) (5.398) (1.867) (3.839) (1.124) (4.453) (5.764) 
Foreign 0.279*** 0.038*** 0.016 0.308*** 0.049*** 0.276*** 0.037*** 0.014 
 (5.759) (3.762) (1.473) (7.731) (3.191) (5.711) (3.491) (1.318) 
CalendarYE 0.005 0.139** 0.134*** -0.032 0.202*** 0.001 0.138** 0.134*** 
 (0.114) (2.514) (3.034) (-0.717) (3.391) (0.021) (2.498) (3.004) 
NonstandardOpinion 0.242*** 0.154*** 0.077*** 0.107** 0.174*** 0.247*** 0.153*** 0.076*** 
 (8.499) (8.121) (8.627) (2.090) (4.138) (8.703) (7.780) (8.831) 
Merger 0.404*** 0.037*** 0.026*** 0.411*** 0.024** 0.403*** 0.036*** 0.025*** 
 (8.508) (4.261) (2.895) (11.813) (2.041) (8.678) (4.096) (2.798) 
Constant 10.140***    9.805***  10.125***    
 (64.007)    (38.092)  (60.961)    
Observations 253,778 253,778 253,778 62,490 62,490 289,006 289,006 289,006 
R-squared 0.705 0.971 0.976 0.743 0.975 0.710 0.972 0.976 
Year-FS FE No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Firm-FS FE No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes 
SE Clustered by firm 
and industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 9: Change in Audit Fees after Adopting High-Work Standards 
Panel B: Predicted values from Panel A regressions 
Column: (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Sample 1: Control group is unaffected 
firms in same period as Treated firms 
Sample 2: Control firms are those affected 
by low-Work standards in adoption period 
Sample 3: Control group consists of 
control firms from Samples 1 and 2 
 Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff 
Control 704,716 809,256 104,540 909,845 1,102,411 192,565 728,440 838,106 109,667 
Treated 804,037 1,035,712 231,676 804,037 1,035,712 231,676 804,037 1,035,712 231,676 
Differences 99,321 226,457 127,136 -105,809 -66,698 39,110 75,597 197,606 122,009 
Table 9, Panel A presents results from estimating Model (8), where all variables are defined in Appendix C. Columns (1) through (3) present 
results when using a sample where the control group consists of unaffected firms in the same period as Treated firms. Columns (4) and (5) 
present results when using a sample where the control group consists of affected firms in their own respective adoption periods. Columns (6) 
through (8) present results when using a sample where the control group consists of a combination of the previous two control groups. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.10, respectively. T-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors clustered by firm and industry are presented in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Panel B presents a difference-in-difference 
analysts of audit fees using the predicted values from the regressions in Panel A. Column (3) corresponds to the coefficients from Column (1) of 
Panel A, Column (6) corresponds to the coefficients from Column (4) of Panel A, and Column (9) corresponds to the coefficients from Column 
(6) of Panel A. 
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Appendix A: Comment Letter Examples 
This appendix contains excerpts from two representative Big 4 comment letters: 
one that is relatively more supportive and one that is relatively more opposed. To illustrate 
the use of positive and negative words from the Loughran and McDonald (2014) 
dictionary, positive words are denoted with bold, underlined font, and negative words with 
italic, underlined font. 
 
Excerpt from a relatively more supportive Big 4 comment letter: 
 
From: KPMG LLP  
Date: January 14, 2011  
Exposure Draft: 1900-100 Proposed Accounting Standards Update, “Transfers and 
Servicing (Topic 860), Reconsideration of Effective Control for Repurchase Agreements” 
 
We support the Board’s objective and the proposed changes to improve the accounting for 
repurchase agreements by focusing the assessment of effective control on the transferor’s 
contractual rights and obligations. We believe the proposed amendments… will be helpful 
in achieving greater comparability in the accounting for repurchase agreements… We 
agree with the Board’s assessment that the benefits of the proposed amendments outweigh 
their cost. A stated above, we believe that one of the main benefits is that the removal of 
the requirement within ASC paragraph 860-10-40-24(b) will result in more consistent 
accounting for repurchase agreements. 
 
 
Excerpt from a relatively more opposed Big 4 comment letter: 
 
From: Deloitte & Touche LLP 
Date: August 7, 2008 
Exposure draft: 1600-100, Proposed Statement — Disclosure of Certain Loss 
Contingencies — an amendment of FASB Statements No. 5 and 141(R) 
 
While we support the FASB’s objective to provide investors and users of financial 
information with more transparent disclosures about loss contingencies, we do not support 
issuance of the proposed Statement because, among other things, we are concerned about 
an auditor’s ability to audit some of the proposed disclosures. In the body of this comment 
letter, we discuss pervasive concerns related to some of the proposed disclosures that we 
believe need to be addressed... While we agree that some type of qualitative disclosure is 
warranted about loss contingencies, including certain remote loss contingencies, we 
believe that the proposed quantitative disclosures would have limited usefulness, could be 
misleading, and may unnecessarily alarm some users of financial statements. 
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Appendix B: Validation of Tone as a Measure of Comment Letter 
Position 
This appendix discusses several validation tests performed to confirm that 
calculated document tone is not inconsistent with the judgments of a human reader.  
The first test compares computed Tone to human reader evaluations of comment 
letter position. I hired two research assistants, blind to the objectives of the study, to each 
read a random sample of 40 Big 4 comment letters and classify them as supportive, 
ambiguous, or opposed. The correlation coefficients between the research assistants’ scales 
(on a 1, 0, -1 basis) and comment letter Tone were 0.635 (p<0.01) and 0.706 (p<0.01).39 
The research assistants agreed on the classification for 26 of the 40 (65%) of the comment 
letters, with a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.475. While there is no consensus on what constitutes 
statistical significance of Kappa,40 0.475 is not high. The agreement percentage and score 
suggest each coder’s evaluation was potentially more consistent with Tone than with the 
other coder’s evaluation.41 High correlation with a human reader but inconsistencies across 
                                                 
39 Research assistant A (B) categorized 9 (13) comment letters as supportive, 15 (15) as ambiguous, and 16 
(12) as opposed. The 15 comment letters classified as ambiguous were the same in only 8 (53.3%) instances. 
40 Cohen (1960) provides a standard error that can be used to calculate significance, but he also notes 
significance is not universal and depends on the setting. Several researchers have offered suggestions for 
interpreting Kappa. Baker et al. (1997) provide benchmarks based on coder fallibility, and suggest a critical 
Kappa value for three categories (as in my setting) of 0.30, 0.40, and 0.57 for expected coder accuracy levels 
of 80%, 85%, and 90%, respectively. 
41 The inability of human coders to consistently code policy-related documents is a well-known issue in 
political science. For example, Mikhaylov, Laver, and Benoit (2011) employ human coders to classify 
positions of party manifestos from the Comparative Manifesto Project. They find that pairs of human coders 
achieve agreement scores in the range of 0.3 to 0.5. They conclude that classifying document position using 
human coders should be implemented with care and using as simple a categorization template as possible, 
which would be difficult in the context of this study considering the topical differences across the 80 exposure 
drafts. 
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human readers supports use of Tone to measure position, particularly given the asymmetric 
costliness of hand coding. 
The second validation test compares average Tone of comment letters stating 
“unambiguous” opposition to average Tone of all comment letters. Rather than relying on 
a comparison of Tone to a human reader’s assessment of position, this test compares Tone 
to a commenter’s stated position. As discussed in Section 4.1, commenters rarely take 
unequivocal positions. However, several comment letters contain overt language such as 
“We do not support the issuance of the exposure draft” or “We do not support the issuance 
of a final standard.” I searched all Big 4 comment letters for the text strings “do not 
support” and “cannot support.” 73 of the 316 letters contained one of these phrases at least 
once. I then read each instance and ruled out 47 cases where the letter used the term(s) to 
express opposition toward a single aspect of the exposure draft (such as the effective date), 
but not the document as a whole. This left 26 documents in which the Big 4 firm explicitly 
stated they did not support issuance of a final standard based on the exposure draft.42 The 
average Tone of these comment letters is -0.474, which is significantly lower than the 
sample mean tone of -0.287 (p<0.001).  
A third validation test addresses the potential concern that Tone could be biased if 
1) comment letters use words directly from an exposure draft or words that are germane to 
                                                 
42 Notably, even comment letters stating ostensibly unequivocal opposition to the issuance of a document 
contain supportive aspects. For example, Deloitte’s comment letter in response to the exposure draft 
“Accounting for Financial Guarantee Insurance Contracts, an Interpretation of FASB Statement No. 60” 
dated June 18, 2007 unambiguously states, “We do not support issuance of this proposed Statement as drafted 
as a final Standard…” but later supports the exposure draft’s disclosure requirements: “We agree that these 
disclosures, combined with the disclosures required by Statement 60, should provide users of financial 
statements with the information they need.” Similar supportive statements on minor issues are found in the 
majority of these 26 comment letters. 
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the exposure draft topic; 2) such words are considered positive or negative in the LM 
dictionary; and 3) such exposure drafts are more likely to increase work, be viewed 
positively by constituents, or have systematically different outcomes. This test exploits the 
11 projects with multiple exposure drafts (see Table 1, Panel A) to examine changes in Big 
4 comment letter Tone over time using a simple difference-in-differences comparison of 
Tone for first and second exposure drafts in successful and failed projects. If Tone captures 
constituent position on an exposure draft and project outcome is associated with constituent 
positions, then Tone should increase (decrease) over time for successful (failed) multi-
exposure draft projects. On the other hand, if exposure draft words or content 
systematically bias comment letter Tone, there should be no association between over-time 
changes in Tone since standard setting topic is held constant. 
The results of this test are presented below in Table B1. Column (1) shows mean 
Tone of Big 4 comment letters submitted on the first exposure draft in a multi-exposure 
draft project are more negative than the sample mean of Big 4 comment letter Tone 
of -0.287. However, Column (2) reflects that successful (failed) projects that ultimately 
lead (do not lead) to issuance of a final standard receive comment letters with higher 
(lower) relative Tone in the second stage. The difference is not statistically significant 
(p=0.417), likely due to a small N, but the difference-in-differences estimate of Tone (-
0.173) is greater than half of mean Big 4 comment letter Tone over the entire sample. This 
result is consistent with my tests of standard setting outcomes, and also validates Tone as 
a proxy for position despite the concern about exposure draft content creating bias, since 
accounting topics are held constant within a project over time. 
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Table B1—Over-time changes in Big4Tone for successful and failed 
FASB projects 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exposure draft sequence = First Second/Third Difference 
Successful projects (N=22, 27) -0.409 -0.322 0.087 
Failed projects (N=8, 8) -0.367 -0.453 -0.086 
 -0.042 -0.131 -0.173 
 
An additional indicator that Tone captures the support or opposition of the comment 
letter is found in the results of my tests of standard setting outcomes. Results from those 
tests, which are discussed fully in Section 5.4, indicate average constituent Tone is 
associated with changes in standard setting outcomes in predicted directions based on 
theory. Such a pattern of results would be unlikely if Tone were unassociated with comment 
letter positions. 
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Appendix C: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
AffectedCARj Average three-day CAR, expressed as a percentage, of firms expected to 
be affected by exposure draft j’s proposed rules over the three-day 
window around exposure draft issuance. CARs are calculated following 
Khan et al. (2018) using the following model: 
 
rit - rft = αit + β1i(rmt - rft) + β2iSMBt + β3iHMLt + β4iUMDt + εit       (1) 
 
where rit is the daily return for firm i, rft is the daily risk-free rate, and rmt 
is the daily market return at date t. SMBt, HMLt, and UMDt are the Fama-
French size, book-to-market, and momentum factors at day t, respectively. 
 
To calculate daily abnormal returns in year τ, I exclude all days in the 
three-day window around any exposure draft issuance date in year τ-1, 
and use the remaining days to estimate the parameters in equation (1) for 
each firm. I require at least 90 observations for the estimation. Next, I use 
the estimated parameters from year τ-1 to calculate daily abnormal returns 
(αit) for all days in the three-day window around each event date in year τ. 
Finally, I aggregate abnormal returns over the exposure draft issuance 
window to compute the CAR. 
 
To identify affected firms, I read each exposure draft and develop 
proposal-specific criteria using Compustat variables. Unaffected firms are 
all those in the Compustat universe not meeting the established criteria. 
This approach is similar to that used in Khan et al. (2018). Appendix B 
outlines the criteria used to identify affected firms. 
 
AllBig4ClientTonej Average Tone of comment letters written by clients of all Big 4 firm in 
response to exposure draft j.  
 
Big4Toneij Tone of the comment letter written by Big 4 firm i in response to exposure 
draft j. 
 
ClientToneij Average Tone of comment letters written by clients of Big 4 firm i in 
response to exposure draft j. 
 
ExDraftTonej Tone of exposure draft j. 
 
GAAPj Change from exposure draft to final standard in the content of the 
standard. Calculated by first removing all introductory and summary 
content and the basis for conclusions from exposure drafts and final 
standards, stemming all words using the Porter stemming algorithm, and 
removing stop words. Then, 
 
GAAPj  = 1 - Similarj, 
 
where Similarj is the pairwise cosine similarity between each document. 
Suppose the sample of 71 first exposure drafts and 66 final standards 
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contains n unique words. Then each document d can be represented as an 
n-dimension vector:  
 
vd = (wd1, wd2, … , wdn-1, wdn) 
 
where wdi, i ∈ [1,n] is a count of the number of times each word appears 
in document d. Similarj between documents exposure draft (ED) and final 
standard (FS) is then defined as: 
 
Similarj = cos(θ) = 
vED
‖vED‖
 ⋅ 
vFS
‖vFS‖
= 
vED⋅vFS
‖vED‖‖vFS‖
 
 
where is the angle between vectors vED and vFS, (·) is the dot product 
operator, and ||vd|| is the vector length of vd. Similarj is bounded between 0 
and 1, with higher values indicating greater similarity between 
documents. Brown and Tucker (2011) show that cosine similarity is a 
decreasing function of the length of the two compared documents. Thus, I 
adopt an approach comparable to Brown and Tucker (2011) and Lee 
(2016) and first regress Similar on the length of the exposure draft and 
final standard, including squared and cubed terms. I rank the residual 
from this regression into deciles and divide by 10 for a length-adjusted 
similarity score. Results are robust to using raw cos(), using the 
unranked regression residual, and calculating cos() after limiting the 
dimensionality of vectors vd to the most frequently used 25, 50, or 100 
words in the document-pair. 
 
LnAgendaExDraftDays Natural logarithm of the number of days between the FASB adding the 
project to its technical agenda and exposure draft issuance. (Note that 
descriptive statistics present this variable unlogged.) 
 
LnCLCountj Natural log of the total number of comment letters received in response to 
exposure draft j. (Note that descriptive statistics present this variable 
unlogged.) 
 
LnCLWordsij Natural log of the number of words in comment letter i received in 
response to exposure draft j. (Note that descriptive statistics present this 
variable unlogged.) 
 
LnDaystoFSj Natural logarithm of the number of days between exposure draft issuance 
and final standard issuance for completed FASB projects. (Note that 
descriptive statistics present this variable unlogged.) 
 
LnExDraftWordsj Natural log of the number of words in the body of exposure draft j. The 
body of the exposure draft is obtained by deleting the title page, summary, 
background information, and basis for conclusions. (Note that descriptive 
statistics present this variable unlogged.) 
 
 
LnFSWordsj Natural log of the number of words in the body of the final standard 
associated with exposure draft j. The body of the final standard is 
obtained by deleting the title page, summary, background information, 
and basis for conclusions. (Note that descriptive statistics present this 
variable unlogged.) 
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ProjectFailj An indicator equal to one if the exposure draft did not lead to a final 
standard and the FASB explicitly removed the project from its standard 
setting agenda, and zero otherwise. 
 
Tone [ ( Number of positive words - Number of negative words ) / ( Number of 
positive words + Number of negative words ) ] 
 
Positive and negative words are based on the Loughran and McDonald 
(2014 - LM) Master Dictionary, after first removing the following terms 
with tonal categorization in the LM Master Dictionary: “disclose,” 
“disclosed,” “discloses,” “disclosing,” “defined benefit,” “effective date,” 
“effective control,” “going concern,” “troubled debt restructuring,” and 
“loss contingency.”  
 
UserTonej Average Tone of comment letters written by financial statement users in 
response to exposure draft j. 
 
Workj A ranking of IGParagraphs, the total number of paragraphs affecting 
(i.e., adding, amending, or superseding) implementation guidance in an 
exposure draft, weighted by Ubiquity, the proportion of firms expected to 
be affected by the proposed standard: 
 
( IGParagraphs + 1 ) X Ubiquity 
 
To identify affected firms, I review each exposure draft and develop 
proposal-specific criteria using Compustat variables. Unaffected firms are 
all those in the Compustat universe not meeting the established criteria. 
This approach is similar to that used in Khan et al. (2018). The Internet 
Appendix outlines the criteria used to identify affected firms. I rank this 
variable and then convert it to be on the same scale as other independent 
variables of interest [-1,1] using the transformation ( 2 x [ (rank – 1) / (N 
– 1) ] – 1 ). 
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Appendix D: Top and Bottom 10 Exposure Drafts for Work 
The below table shows the exposure drafts with the ten highest and lowest values of Work. The exposure drafts can be 
found on the FASB website (link: http://bit.ly/FASBEDs). All criteria are based on Compustat variables and/or the Fama and 
French 49 industries. The approach for identifying affected firms is similar to that used in Khan et al. (2018) to identify firms 
affected by final standards, and is outlined in the Internet Appendix for all exposure drafts in my sample. 
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Exposure 
Draft 
Issuance 
Date 
Title 
Final 
Standard 
Ubiquity 
IG-
Paragraphs 
Work 
2011-230 1/4/2012 Topic 605—Revenue from Contracts with Customers  ASU 2014-09 88.59% 980 1 
2013-270 5/16/2013 Topic 842—Leases ASU 2016-02 65.50% 527 0.975 
1102-100 3/31/2004 Share-Based Payment: an amendment of SFASs 123 and 95 SFAS 123R 68.45% 193 0.924 
2015-250 5/12/2015 Topic 606—Identifying Performance Obligations and Licensing ASU 2016-10 85.86% 97 0.899 
1820-100 6/24/2010 Topic 605—Revenue from Contracts with Customers ASU 2014-09 90.49% 96 0.873 
1204-001 6/30/2005 Business Combinations—a replacement of SFAS 141  SFAS 141R 40.87% 136 0.848 
2015-270 6/8/2015 Topic 718—Employee Share-Based Payments ASU 2016-09 79.64% 46 0.823 
2015-290 8/31/2015 Topic 606—Principal versus Agent ASU 2016-08 86.00% 41 0.797 
1025-200 9/12/2003 Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits SFAS 132R 54.77% 55 0.772 
1850-100 8/17/2010 Topic 840—Leases ASU 2016-02 68.89% 31 0.747 
2014-220 7/15/2014 Subtopic 225-20—Eliminating the Concept of Extraordinary Items ASU 2015-01 - 49 -0.797 
2015-320 9/30/2015 Topic 606—Narrow-Scope Improvements and Practical Expedients ASU 2016-12 - 28 -0.823 
1500-200 10/9/2006 Not-for-Profit Organizations: Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets SFAS 164 - 17 -0.848 
2013-320 11/7/2013 Topic 915—Development stage entities ASU 2014-10 - 1 -0.873 
1200-300 12/15/2003 Exchanges of Productive Assets SFAS 153 - 0 -1 
1300-001 4/28/2005 Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles SFAS 162 - 0 -1 
1640-100 10/9/2008 Subsequent Events SFAS 165 - 0 -1 
1690-100 3/27/2009 Hierarchy of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles and ASC ASU 2009-01 - 0 -1 
1760-100 12/29/2009 Topic 855—Amendments to Certain Subsequent Event Requirements  ASU 2010-09 - 0 -1 
2013-200 1/7/2013 Topic 825—Scope of a Disclosure for Nonpublic Entities ASU 2013-03 - 0 -1 
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Appendix E: Criteria for Identifying Affected Firms and Work Variable 
The below table outlines criteria used to identify Compustat firms expected to be affected by each exposure draft used 
in my analyses. The exposure drafts can be found on the FASB website. All criteria are based on Compustat variables and/or 
the Fama French 49 industries. The approach is similar to that used in Khan et al. (2018) to identify firms affected by final 
standards. 
 
Exposure 
Draft 
Issuance 
Date 
Title 
Final 
Standard 
Criteria to identify affected firms Ubiquity 
AgendaEx 
DraftDays 
1100-163 5/1/02 Amendment of SFAS 133 on 
Derivatives and Hedging 
SFAS 149 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
1.84% 212 
1101-001 10/4/02 Stock-Based Compensation-Transition 
and Disclosure 
SFAS 148 Firms whose stock based compensation (stcko) is greater 
than zero. 
19.74% 64 
1063-100 2/20/03 Real Estate Time-Sharing Transactions SFAS 152 Firms in the real estate industry (FF49 = 47). 0.95% 234 
1200-001 6/10/03 Qualifying Special-Purpose Entities 
and Isolation of Transferred Assets 
SFAS 166 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
1.87% 160 
1025-200 9/12/03 Pensions and Other Postretirement 
Benefits 
SFAS 132R Firms whose pension and retirement expense (xpr) is 
greater than zero. 
54.77% 2,049 
1200-100 12/15/03 Inventory Costs SFAS 151 Firms whose inventory balance (invt) is greater than 
zero. 
65.93% 453 
1200-400 12/15/03 Accounting Changes and Error 
Corrections 
SFAS 154 Firms whose absolute value of cumulative effect of 
accounting change (acchg) is greater than zero in any of 
the previous three years. 
15.86% 453 
1200-200 12/15/03 Earnings per Share: an amendment of 
SFAS 128 
- Firms whose absolute value of the difference between 
reported EPS and diluted EPS (|epspi - epsfi|) is greater 
than zero in any of the previous three years. 
40.60% 453 
1200-300 12/15/03 Exchanges of Productive Assets SFAS 153 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
- 453 
1102-100 3/31/04 Share-Based Payment: an amendment 
of SFASs 123 and 95 
SFAS 123R Firms whose stock option expense (xintopt) is greater 
than zero. 
68.45% 396 
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Exposure 
Draft 
Issuance 
Date 
Title 
Final 
Standard 
Criteria to identify affected firms Ubiquity 
AgendaEx 
DraftDays 
1201-100 6/23/04 Fair Value Measurements SFAS 157 Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 7.62% 388 
1300-001 4/28/05 Hierarchy of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles 
SFAS 162 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
 
 
- 301 
1204-001 6/30/05 Business Combinations—a 
replacement of SFAS 141  
SFAS 141R Firms with either 1) an increase in balance of goodwill 
(gdwl), 2) acquisition cash effect (aqc) greater than zero, 
or 3) sales footnote code (sale_fn) of 'AA', 'AB', 'AR', 
'AS', 'FA', 'FB', 'FD', 'FE', or 'FF' in any of the previous 
three years. 
40.87% 1,490 
1205-001 6/30/05 Consolidated Financial Statements, 
Including Noncontrolling Interests in 
Subsidiaries 
SFAS 160 Firms whose minority interest (mibt) is greater than 
zero. 
19.34% 1,490 
1210-001 8/11/05 Accounting for Certain Hybrid 
Financial Instruments 
SFAS 155 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.38% 588 
1220-001 8/11/05 Servicing of Financial Assets: an 
amendment of SFAS 140 
SFAS 156 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.38% 1,805 
1225-001 8/11/05 Transfers of Financial Assets: an 
amendment of SFAS 140 
SFAS 166 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.38% 932 
1240-001 9/30/05 Earnings per Share—an amendment of 
SFAS 128  
- Firms whose absolute value of the difference between 
reported EPS and diluted EPS (epspi - epsfi) is greater 
than zero in any of the previous three years. 
44.48% 1,108 
1025-300 3/31/06 Defined Benefit Pension and Other 
Postretirement Plans 
SFAS 158 Firms whose difference between pension projected 
benefit obligation and pension plan assets (pbpro - 
pplao) is greater than zero. 
21.61% 150 
1500-100 10/9/06 Not-for-Profit Mergers and 
Acquisitions: a replacement of APB 16 
SFAS 164 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms - exposure draft would apply to nonpublic 
entities. 
- 2,595 
1500-200 10/9/06 Not-for-Profit Organizations: Goodwill 
and Other Intangible Assets 
SFAS 164 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms - exposure draft would apply to nonpublic 
entities. 
- 2,595 
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Exposure 
Draft 
Issuance 
Date 
Title 
Final 
Standard 
Criteria to identify affected firms Ubiquity 
AgendaEx 
DraftDays 
1510-100 12/8/06 Disclosures about Derivativs and 
Hedging: an amendment of SFAS 133  
SFAS 161 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.26% 647 
1530-100 4/18/07 Financial Guarantee Insurance 
Contracts—an interpretation of SFAS 
60  
SFAS 163 Firms in the real estate industry (FF49 = 47). 0.86% 686 
1600-100 6/5/08 Disclosure of Certain Loss 
Contingencies—an amendment of 
SFASs 5 and 141(R) 
- Firms whose absolute value of settlements on the 
income statement (seta) is greater than zero in any of the 
previous three years. 
23.62% 278 
1590-100 6/6/08 Hedging Activities—an amendment of 
SFAS 133   
ASU 2016-01 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.16% 402 
1610-100 9/15/08 Transfers of Financial Assets: an 
amendment of SFAS 140 
SFAS 166 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.16% 2,063 
1620-100 9/15/08 Amendments to FIN 46R SFAS 167 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking, construction, machinery, utilities, 
transportation, retail, and insuranc industries (FF49 = 45, 
46, 21, 18, 43, 41, 31) 
2.16% 198 
1650-100 10/9/08 Going Concern ASU 2014-15 Firms in the lowest quartile of Altman Z-score and not 
in the banking industry, where Altman Z is calculated as 
(1.2*((act-lct)/at) + 1.4*(re/at) + 3.3*(oiadp/at) + 
0.6*((prcc_f*csho)/lt) + 1.0*(sale/at)). 
18.49% 69 
1640-100 10/9/08 Subsequent Events SFAS 165 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
- 69 
1690-100 3/27/09 Hierarchy of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles and ASC 
ASU 2009-01 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
- 1,730 
1700-100 6/24/09 Disclosures about Quality of 
Receivables and the Allowance for 
Credit Losses  
ASU 2010-20 Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 8.61% 905 
1720-100 8/28/09 Topic 810—Scope Clarification--
Decreases in Ownership of a 
Subsidiary 
ASU 2010-02 Firms whose minority interest (mibt) is greater than 
zero. 
21.52% 239 
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Issuance 
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Final 
Standard 
Criteria to identify affected firms Ubiquity 
AgendaEx 
DraftDays 
1710-100 8/28/09 Topic 820—Fair Value Measurements 
and Disclosures 
ASU 2010-06 Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 8.67% 180 
1730-100 9/15/09 Topic 932—Oil and Gas Reserve 
Estimation 
ASU 2010-03 Firms in the Petroleum and Natural Gas industry (FF49 
= 30). 
3.93% 226 
1740-100 10/13/09 Topic 815—Scope Exception for 
Embedded Credit Derivatives  
ASU 2010-11 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.16% 316 
1750-100 12/4/09 Topic 810—Amendments to SFAS 167 
for Certain Funds  
ASU 2010-10 Firms in the financial trading industry (FF49 = 48). 4.73% 64 
1760-100 12/29/09 Topic 855—Amendments to Certain 
Subsequent Event Requirements  
ASU 2010-09 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
- 515 
1790-100 5/26/10 Topic 220—Statement of 
Comprehensive Income 
ASU 2011-05 Firms whose absolute value of other comprehensive 
income (citotal - ni) is greater than zero in any of the 
previous three years. 
63.82% 602 
1810-100 5/26/10 Topics 825 and 815—Derivatives and 
Hedging 
ASU 2016-13 Firms in the top half of total assets (at) in the banking 
industry (FF49 = 45). 
4.29% 541 
1820-100 6/24/10 Topic 605—Revenue from Contracts 
with Customers 
ASU 2014-09 Firms whose revenue (sale) is greater than zero. 90.49% 2,976 
1830-100 6/29/10 Topic 820—Amendments for Common 
Fair Value Measurements and 
Disclosures 
ASU 2011-04 Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 8.57% 271 
1840-100 7/20/10 Topic 450—Disclosure of Certain Loss 
Contingencies 
- Firms whose absolute value of settlements on the 
income statement (seta) is greater than zero in any of the 
previous three years. 
21.99% 1,053 
1850-100 8/17/10 Topic 840—Leases ASU 2016-02 Firms whose minimum rental commitments in any of the 
following five years (mrc1, mrc2, mrc3, mrc4, mrc5) are 
greater than zero. 
68.89% 1,490 
1860-100 9/1/10 Subtopic 715-80—Disclosure about 
Participation in a Multiemployer Plan 
ASU 2011-09 Firms in industries with greater than 10% union 
employment in 2009, based on the database of Barry 
Hirsch and David Macpherson at www.unionstats.com. 
10.90% 243 
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Standard 
Criteria to identify affected firms Ubiquity 
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1880-100 10/12/10 Topic 310—Troubled Debt 
Restructurings 
ASU 2011-02 Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 8.54% 90 
1900-100 11/3/10 Topic 860—Reconsideration of 
Effective Control for Repos 
ASU 2011-03 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.14% 112 
2011-100 1/28/11 Topic 210—Offsetting  ASU 2011-11 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.18% 392 
2011-180 4/22/11 Topic 350—Testing Goodwill for 
Impairment 
ASU 2011-08 Firms with goodwill greater than zero. 46.71% 135 
2011-200 10/21/11 Topic 946—Amendments to 
Investment Company Guidance 
ASU 2013-08 Firms in the financial trading industry (FF49 = 48). 4.90% 1,603 
2011-210 10/21/11 Topic 973—Real Estate Investment 
Company Guidance 
- Firms in the real estate industry (FF49 = 47). 1.00% 658 
2011-220 11/3/11 Topic 810—Principal versus Agent 
Analysis 
ASU 2015-02 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking, construction, machinery, utilities, 
transportation, retail, and insuranc industries (FF49 = 45, 
46, 21, 18, 43, 41, 31) 
5.53% 763 
2011-230 1/4/12 Topic 605—Revenue from Contracts 
with Customers  
ASU 2014-09 Firms whose revenue (sale) is greater than zero. 88.59% 3,535 
2012-100 1/25/12 Topic 350—Testing Indefinite-Lived 
Intangible Assets for Impairment 
ASU 2012-02 Firms whose ratio of intangible assets other than 
goodwill over total assets (intano/at) is above the 
Compustat median. 
49.94% 132 
2012-200 6/27/12 Topic 825—Disclosures about 
Liquidity Risk and Interest Rate Risk 
- Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 8.75% 178 
2012-210 7/2/12 Topic 205—The Liquidation Basis of 
Accounting 
ASU 2013-07 Firms in the lowest decile of Altman Z-score and not in 
the banking industry, where Altman Z is calculated as 
(1.2*((act-lct)/at) + 1.4*(re/at) + 3.3*(oiadp/at) + 
0.6*((prcc_f*csho)/lt) + 1.0*(sale/at)). 
7.10% 1,278 
2012-240 8/16/12 Topic 220—Presentation of Items 
Reclassified Out of AOCI 
ASU 2013-02 Firms whose absolute value of other comprehensive 
income (citotal - ni) is greater than zero in any of the 
previous three years. 
64.18% 1,415 
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2012-250 11/26/12 Topic 210—Scope of Disclosures 
about Offsetting Assets and Liabilities 
ASU 2013-01 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.17% 361 
2012-260 12/20/12 Subtopic 825-15—Measurement of 
Credit Losses 
ASU 2016-13 Firms in the banking industry (FF49 = 45). 8.65% 1,541 
2013-200 1/7/13 Topic 825—Scope of a Disclosure for 
Nonpublic Entities 
ASU 2013-03 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms - exposure draft would apply to nonpublic 
entities. 
- 617 
2013-210 1/15/13 Topic 860—Effective Control for 
Transfers with Forward Agreements 
ASU 2014-11 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.13% 627 
2013-221 2/14/13 Subtopic 825-10—Recognition and 
Measurement of Financial Assets 
Liabilities 
ASU 2016-01 Firms in the top quartile of total assets (at) in the 
banking industry (FF49 = 45). 
2.13% 1,597 
2013-230 4/2/13 Topic 205—Reporting Discontinued 
Operations 
ASU 2014-08 Firms whose absolute value of discontinued operations 
on the income statement (do) for the following year is 
greater than zero. 
6.15% 1,650 
2013-270 5/16/13 Topic 842—Leases ASU 2016-02 Firms whose minimum rental commitments in any of the 
following five years (mrc1, mrc2, mrc3, mrc4, mrc5) are 
greater than zero. 
65.50% 2,493 
2013-300 6/26/13 Topic 205—Disclosures about Going 
Concern Presumption 
ASU 2014-15 Firms in the lowest quartile of Altman Z-score and not 
in the banking industry, where Altman Z is calculated as 
(1.2*((act-lct)/at) + 1.4*(re/at) + 3.3*(oiadp/at) + 
0.6*((prcc_f*csho)/lt) + 1.0*(sale/at)). 
17.43% 1,790 
2013-320 11/7/13 Topic 915—Development stage 
entities 
ASU 2014-10 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
- 114 
2014-210 7/15/14 Topic 330—Measurement of Inventory ASU 2015-11 Firms whose inventory balance (invt) is greater than 
zero. 
57.86% 48 
2014-220 7/15/14 Subtopic 225-20—Eliminating the 
Concept of Extraordinary Items 
ASU 2015-01 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms. 
- 48 
2014-230 8/20/14 Subtopic 350-40—Fees Paid in a 
Cloud Computing Arrangement 
ASU 2015-05 Firms in the computer software industry (FF49 = 36). 6.61% 114 
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DraftDays 
2014-250 10/14/14 Subtopic 835-30—Presentation of Debt 
Issuance Cost 
ASU 2015-03 Firms whose total debt to assets ratio ( (dlc + dltt) / at ) 
is greater than the Compustat median. 
25.10% 62 
2014-260 10/14/14 Topic 715—Measurement Date for 
Defined Benefit Obligation and Plan 
Assets 
ASU 2015-04 Firms whose pension projected benefit obligation 
(pbpro) or pension plan assets (pplao) is greater than 
zero. 
22.26% 62 
2014-270 12/4/14 Topic 946—Disclosures about 
Investments in Other Investment 
Companies 
- Firms in the financial trading industry (FF49 = 48). 5.25% 827 
2015-200 1/22/15 Topic 740—Intra-Entity Asset 
Transfers and Classification of 
Deferred Taxes 
ASU 2015-17 Firms whose ratio of current deferred tax assets to total 
net deferred tax assets (txdbca / txndba) or ratio of 
current deferred tax liability to total net deferred tax 
liability (txdbcl / txndbl) is greater than the Compustat 
median. 
14.47% 162 
2015-230 4/22/15 Topics 958 and 954—Financial 
Statements of Not-for-Profit Entities 
ASU 2016-14 Unable to establish robust criteria for identifying 
affected firms - exposure draft would apply to nonpublic 
entities. 
- 1,260 
2015-250 5/12/15 Topic 606—Identifying 
Performance Obligations and 
Licensing 
ASU 2016-10 Firms whose revenue (sale) is greater than zero. 85.86% 83 
2015-260 5/21/15 Topic 805—Measurement-Period 
Adjustments 
ASU 2015-16 Firms with either 1) an increase in balance of goodwill 
(gdwl), 2) acquisition cash effect (aqc) greater than zero, 
or 3) sales footnote code (sale_fn) of 'AA', 'AB', 'AR', 
'AS', 'FA', 'FB', 'FD', 'FE', or 'FF' in any of the previous 
three years. 
33.77% 64 
2015-280 6/5/15 Topic 323—Equity Method of 
Accounting 
ASU 2016-07 Firms whose equity income from investees in earnings 
(esub) is greater than zero. 
13.31% 79 
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